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The Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment death penalty case law 
is in disarray, and the confusion is symptomatic of a larger problem in 
constitutional doctrine. In Baze v. Rees and Kennedy v. Louisiana, the 
Court approached the challenged state policies with vastly different levels 
of deference. Though the Court purported to apply longstanding Eighth 
Amendment tests in both cases, Baze was highly deferential to state policy, 
and Kennedy was not deferential at all. Remarkably, neither the Court nor 
legal scholars have acknowledged, let alone justified, these contrasting 
approaches.  
This Article proposes a theory of deference to address this discrepancy. 
Courts often premise deference in constitutional cases on political 
authority and epistemic authority. While these rationales make sense in 
theory, courts sometimes mechanically repeat them without asking 
whether the responsible institution enjoys either kind of authority in 
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reality. Courts should engage in such inquiries before summarily granting 
or denying deference.  
In light of these principles, the Court approached the problems of 
deference in Baze and Kennedy carelessly. Whereas Baze assumed 
(without explanation) that the state possessed political and epistemic 
authority worthy of deference, Kennedy assumed (also without 
explanation) the exact opposite. Attention to these issues in the Eighth 
Amendment and other constitutional contexts would encourage more 
transparent, deliberative policymaking and more careful, candid judicial 
constitutional decision making.  
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INTRODUCTION  
The United States Supreme Court recently announced two high-profile 
Eighth Amendment death penalty decisions. In Baze v. Rees,
1
 the Court 
upheld Kentucky‘s lethal injection procedure against a challenge that it 
created an unconstitutional risk of excruciating pain. Less than three 
months later, in Kennedy v. Louisiana,
2
 the Court struck down Louisiana‘s 
statute permitting the imposition of the death penalty for child rape. The 
Court in both cases purported to apply longstanding Eighth Amendment 
tests to determine whether a state practice is ―cruel and unusual.‖3 Both 
cases, for instance, discussed other states‘ practices, ―evolving standards 
of decency,‖ and the vague concept of ―dignity.‖ In other words, even 
though one case challenged a method of execution and the other 
challenged a death sentence as disproportionate to the crime, the Court 
posed similar questions in both cases.  
Despite these ostensible similarities, the Court approached its own 
questions very differently. Baze was highly deferential to the state policy; 
Kennedy was not deferential at all.
4
 Baze ignored details increasing the 
risk of excruciating pain and, in a far-reaching opinion, not only rejected 
the challenge to Kentucky‘s lethal injection procedure but also ostensibly 
protected other states‘ procedures. By contrast, Kennedy went out of its 
way to question the penological efficacy of Louisiana‘s policy. Nowhere, 
though, did the Court explain why it was properly positioned to overrule 
the Louisiana legislature‘s determination that capital punishment served 
 
 
 1. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). 
 2. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).  
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
 4. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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retributive and deterrent purposes in this context or why its view of the 
facts was superior to the State‘s. In short, Baze gave all benefit of the 
doubt to the State, whereas Kennedy gave none.
5
  
There are ways of explaining the Court‘s different approaches.6 
Perhaps the Court cares more about policing ―who‖ will be executed than 
―how‖ he will be executed. It might believe, for instance, that invalidating 
a method of execution would require intrusive judicial oversight of the 
replacement method. The Court, however, does not articulate or justify 
that preference. Nor is such a preference justifiable; alternative methods of 
execution are easily implemented without substantial judicial 
involvement.
7
 Nor did the Court embrace any of the other potential 
explanations for the discrepancy. Moreover, such explanations are 
ultimately just that—explanations, not adequate justifications. The Court, 
of course, need not decide all Eighth Amendment cases the same way, but 
when it approaches cases arising under the same constitutional provision 
so differently, it ought to explain what triggers such different levels of 
review. The Court needs a theory of deference.  
This Article explores the long-ignored problem of constitutional 
deference that is highlighted by these contrasting decisions. The levels of 
deference—judicial respect for the political branches‘ policy judgments 
and factual determinations
8—are often outcome determinative in 
constitutional cases, yet there is often no roadmap for the level selected. 
The Court, of course, uses the familiar tiers of scrutiny (rational basis, 
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny) in, inter alia, equal protection 
and First Amendment doctrine, but it applies those tiers inconsistently and 
has not imported them to all constitutional doctrine. Similarly, the Court 
sometimes defers to legislative facts but offers little guidance to lower 
courts and litigants as to when such deference is appropriate.
9
 Scholars, for 
their part, have focused little on the issue of deference outside the obvious 
context of the tiers of scrutiny.
10
  
Judicial and scholarly silence, however, is misleading. The degree of 
deference often dictates the result in constitutional cases.
11
 And whether it 
 
 
 5. See infra Part I.B.  
 6. See infra Part II.  
 7. See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & 
POL‘Y REV. 259, 315–23 (2009) (discussing easily implemented remedies); infra Part II.A.  
 8. See infra Parts I.A, III.A. 
 9. See infra Parts I.A, I.B.3. 
 10. See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2008) 
(―Deference . . . has received surprisingly little . . . attention in constitutional scholarship.‖).  
 11. See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of 
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admits it or not, the Court approaches cases with widely varying degrees 
of deference.
12
 Though the Court typically does not articulate a level of 
deference in Eighth Amendment cases, it is quite clear that it applied 
something resembling strict scrutiny in Kennedy and, essentially, rational 
basis review in Baze.
13
 In neither case, though, did the Court explain what 
triggers rigorous or lax review on either policy or factual questions. This 
Article examines the Court‘s stealth, outcome-determinative judgments 
and proposes more transparent factors that the Court should consider when 
selecting a level of deference in Eighth Amendment and other 
constitutional cases, particularly those currently lacking doctrinal 
approaches to deference.  
This examination begins with what often drives judicial deference in 
constitutional cases in the first place: political authority and epistemic 
authority.
14
 With regards to political authority, the Constitution separates 
power into three branches of government,
15
 and political branch 
officials—who are often elected by and answerable to ―the people‖—
usually possess more authority to make policy decisions than 
unaccountable judges.
16
 As for epistemic authority, the political branches 
also often have a technical expertise that exceeds judges‘ in many 
substantive areas, so courts frequently stay away from fact-laden debates.
17
 
There are, of course, other reasons for judges to defer, but these two are 
often paramount in constitutional cases.  
While these rationales in theory seem reasonable, courts in practice 
sometimes cite them without regard to whether they actually make sense 
in a given case. For example, to the extent that political authority concerns 
militate in favor of judicial restraint, lest courts interfere with the will of 
 
 
Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 953 (1999) (―The practice of deference has drastic effects on the 
outcomes of cases . . . .‖).  
 12. Cf. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 254 (1994) (―The question . . . is what . . . causes the variation in the 
judicial role.‖).  
 13. I use terms like ―strict scrutiny‖ and ―rational basis‖ in the Eighth Amendment context as 
shorthand to generally indicate the Court‘s level of deference. In using those terms, I am not 
suggesting that the Court has imported or should import the formulaic tiers of scrutiny from equal 
protection and other doctrines to the Eighth Amendment context.  
 14. See Horwitz, supra note 10, at 1078 (explaining that courts defer typically for reasons of 
―legal authority‖ and ―epistemic authority‖) (emphasis omitted); infra Parts I.A, III.A.  
 15. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III.  
 16. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 18 (2d ed. 1986) (questioning the legitimacy of judicial review by unelected 
judges who overturn actions of elected, accountable government officials). 
 17. See Horwitz, supra note 10, at 1085–86 (explaining that courts defer on epistemic grounds 
when they believe another institution will be better than the judiciary at evaluating relevant facts). 
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the people, application of deference on these grounds assumes that the 
challenged governmental policy roughly reflects democratic preferences.
18
 
But not all governmental policies are products of an equally democratic 
genesis. In some cases, elected legislators pass a bill, and it is signed into 
law by the elected executive. Other times, low-level bureaucrats craft 
policies in secret with no legislative guidance or oversight.
19
 In such cases, 
the political authority of the policy should not be taken for granted. 
Similarly, to the extent that deference rests on epistemic authority, that 
deference is less warranted when the political branches, in fact, lack any 
real understanding of the relevant subject. 
Deference should therefore turn in part on the actual (rather than 
theoretical) political authority and epistemic authority behind a policy‘s 
enactment. In other words, deference should turn on the applicability of 
the very reasons courts typically cite when they defer. Collectively, a 
policy‘s political authority and epistemic authority comprise what I call 
that policy‘s ―democratic pedigree.‖ (I am therefore using the phrase 
―democratic pedigree‖ as a shorthand for the political and epistemic 
authority underlying a challenged policy.) Inquiries into democratic 
pedigree—that is, into political and epistemic authority—should help 
courts determine the extent to which governmental policy and factual 
determinations result from properly functioning governmental processes 
that help ―ensur[e] broad participation in the processes and [benefits] of 
government.‖20  
To ascertain a policy‘s political authority, courts should first consider 
the political authority of the governmental institution creating that policy. 
Courts often treat legislative policies as presumptively democratic,
21
 but 
the political authority of administrative agencies, by contrast, turns more 
on context. To gauge this authority, courts can look at the nature of the 
administrative processes used to adopt a challenged policy (such as a 
lethal injection procedure). Specifically, courts, drawing on administrative 
 
 
 18. Cf. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 128–32 
(1996) (explaining that democratic theory does not pretend that representatives represent constituents 
perfectly).  
 19. See infra Parts III.B.1.b, III.C.1.  
 20. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87 (1980); 
see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 15 
(2005) [hereinafter BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY] (arguing that policy should be traceable to the people 
themselves). 
 21. Of course, it is debatable whether legislative action should be treated as presumptively 
democratic, but the Court has indicated that it should be. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 n.9 (1983) (discussing the ―presumption of constitutionality 
afforded legislation drafted by Congress‖); infra Part III.B.1.a.  
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law principles, should consider (1) the specificity of the legislative 
delegation; (2) the extent to which the legislature intended to grant the 
agency lawmaking authority; (3) the extent to which the agency adopted 
its policy using formalized administrative procedures and weighing 
constitutional constraints; (4) the amount of oversight over the delegated 
policy; and (5) the transparency with which the officials adopted and 
implemented the policy.
22
 Collectively, these inquiries can help courts 
ascertain whether the enacting agency possesses genuine political 
authority and accountability worthy of judicial deference. Deference under 
this inquiry, then, should exist on a sliding scale—the more political 
authority, the more deference the agency presumptively deserves. In other 
words, if an agency has adopted a policy without legislative guidance, 
lawmaking authority, formalized procedures, oversight, or transparency, 
the political authority of the resulting policy is weak.  
Another component of political authority draws on the famous 
Carolene Products footnote.
23
 This inquiry asks whether the challenged 
policy (whether legislative or administrative) uniquely burdens unpopular 
minorities incapable of protecting themselves through the usual political 
processes.
24
 Policies that burden only select portions of the population and 
not, as John Hart Ely put it, ―people like us‖ are inherently suspect 
because they deny classes of people broad participation in government.
25
 
When a policy denies segments of the population access to the process, 
distributions, and benefits of government, the political authority 
undermining that policy is compromised.
26
 Courts should therefore view 
with suspicion policies burdening such select groups.
27
  
In addition to political authority, deference should also turn in part on 
the epistemic authority of the responsible officials. Courts often assume 
that the other branches possess superior expertise over policy matters and 
that they bring that expertise to bear on their policy decisions.
28
 This 
 
 
 22. See infra Part III.B.1.b. 
 23. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
 24. See id. (―[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . call[s] for a . . . more 
searching judicial inquiry.‖); ELY, supra note 20, at 135–80 (discussing ways to facilitate the 
representation of minorities); infra Part III.B.1.c. 
 25. ELY, supra note 20, at 173–75. 
 26. See id. 
 27. For more thorough critiques and elaborations of Ely‘s theory, see generally Bruce A. 
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 742 (1985) (discussing which 
minorities deserve judicial protection); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065–67 (1980) (criticizing process-based theories); 
Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional 
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045–57 (1980) (critiquing Ely‘s theory); infra Part III.B.1.c.  
 28. See infra Part III.B.2.  
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assumption is often correct, but not always. When it is wrong, judicial 
deference on the basis of the other branches‘ supposed epistemic authority 
is undeserved, particularly when the political actor is an administrative 
agency whose political legitimacy is premised in substantial part on its 
supposed expertise.  
Given that judicial deference so often rests on the unconsidered 
assumption that the challenged practice has been crafted with suitable 
political authority and expertise, these considerations help determine 
whether those assumptions are well founded in a particular case. If well 
founded, then deference may, in fact, be appropriate. If not, then courts 
should not defer simply because the policy emanates from the political 
branches. Indeed, when courts defer to administrative actors lacking 
political and epistemic authority, they effectively let such actors shape the 
meaning of the Constitution, sometimes in profound ways. Some 
administrative actors may never have considered the constitutionality of 
their actions, yet deference to their judgments can have a ―portentous 
aftermath.‖29 Unconsidered judicial deference, in other words, lets policies 
with weak democratic pedigree ―establish[] themselves without any formal 
sanction at all from anybody authorized to state or establish the law of the 
land.‖30 As Charles Black put it, courts should be more careful about 
deferring where ―what is actually involved is a confrontation between the 
Court and some official to whose judgment on constitutionality none of 
the piously repeated rules of deference and restraint have anything like the 
application they might be thought to have to [the legislature].‖31 
Of course, democratic pedigree is difficult to assess, and these factors 
can cut different ways in different cases. Political and epistemic authority 
are complicated themselves, and they may sometimes even clash with each 
other.
32
 This Article does not propose an overarching theory instructing 
courts how always to approach these difficult questions. Instead, it argues 
that courts should be more attuned to these factors, particularly given that 
 
 
 29. BICKEL, supra note 16, at 131–32; see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245–
46 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that once a court reviews and approves governmental 
action, it creates a constitutional rule with its own ―generative power‖).  
 30. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 89 
(1969).  
 31. Id. at 77.  
 32. See, e.g., Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing conflicts 
between the FDA‘s scientific findings and political pressure from the White House regarding the 
availability of Plan B contraception); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From 
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 54 (discussing ―suggestions of widespread tampering by 
the Bush administration with the global warming data reported by numerous federal agencies, 
including EPA,‖ for political reasons).  
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they frequently justify deference on precisely these grounds. To that 
extent, this Article‘s objective is to identify important questions that courts 
have been shortchanging, not to propose a code for courts to resolve those 
issues in all difficult cases.
33
  
Indeed, though significant, democratic pedigree is not all that should 
determine the deference that a court offers a government practice under 
constitutional attack. Deference, after all, is not the substantive inquiry, 
but the lens through which courts conduct the substantive inquiry. 
Substantive concerns, then, might militate for heightened scrutiny, 
independent of a democratic-pedigree analysis. Legislatively enacted 
content-based speech restrictions, for instance, would trigger heightened 
scrutiny, notwithstanding their strong democratic pedigree.
34
 However, in 
determining the level of deference, courts should pay greater attention to 
democratic pedigree, especially when there is good reason to believe, as in 
Baze, that the government is acting entirely out of public view.  
In light of these principles, the Court approached the problem of 
deference carelessly in Baze and Kennedy. Baze looks especially bad 
under the democratic-pedigree inquiry because the Kentucky lethal 
injection procedure was designed in secret by nonexperts without 
legislative guidance or oversight, and yet the Court applied extremely 
deferential review. Had the Court considered the administrative processes 
underlying the challenged procedure, it would have realized that both its 
political and epistemic authority were extremely shaky.  
As for Kennedy, the Court also ignored questions of political and 
epistemic authority in striking down the Louisiana statute. The Court 
treated the question of whether capital punishment for child rape is ―cruel 
and unusual‖ as largely a factual one, considering whether national 
consensus disfavors capital punishment for that crime and whether capital 
punishment serves deterrent or retributive purposes.
35
 For each inquiry, the 
Court concluded that the facts weighed against the constitutionality of the 
Louisiana policy, and, accordingly, it ruled the statute unconstitutional. 
But the Court nowhere explained why (or if) Louisiana‘s political and 
epistemic authority were lacking, simply assuming that the judiciary‘s 
facts were superior to the state legislature‘s.  
 
 
 33. Cf. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 19 (arguing that the democratic tradition of 
the Constitution should inform an ―attitude‖ with which courts approach concrete cases).  
 34. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to flag-
desecration statute because it was content based); see also infra note 232 and accompanying text.  
 35. One might contend that the question of retribution is not so much factual as moral, but the 
Court appeared to measure retribution with factual inquiries. See infra Parts I.B.3, III.C.2.  
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Thus, whereas Baze assumed (without explanation) that the State 
possessed political and epistemic authority worthy of deference, Kennedy 
assumed (also without explanation) the exact opposite. Attention to 
democratic pedigree would not necessarily have resulted in different 
outcomes, but it would have required more careful analyses and greater 
judicial transparency about the factors really driving the decision. Such 
analysis would, in turn, encourage the political branches to engage in more 
deliberative and transparent policymaking.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I opens by defining ―deference.‖ 
After briefly summarizing Baze and Kennedy, it then compares them, 
arguing that while the two cases ostensibly track each other with similar 
language, they treat that language and the factual records very differently. 
Indeed, some language used to defer to the State in Baze is used in 
Kennedy to rigorously review the challenged policy.  
Part II considers potential explanations for this divergence, including 
the different natures of the questions presented, precedent, potential 
interference with the death penalty, litigation costs, and the justices‘ 
personal preferences. Ultimately, however, this Part concludes that while 
these factors help explain the Court‘s decisions, none adequately justifies 
the discrepancy. The Court therefore needs a justification—a theory of 
deference.  
Part III proposes that theory of deference, focusing on the democratic 
pedigree of the challenged policies. It argues that the courts should not 
mechanically rely on the traditional justificiations for judicial deference 
used in many constitutional cases: political and epistemic authority. 
Instead, courts should ask whether these bases for deference actually 
apply—that is, whether the challenged policy was adopted by a 
governmental actor with genuine, rather than illusory, political authority 
and epistemic authority. Applying this theory of deference, the Court then 
could begin to be more straightforward about the factors guiding its review 
of criminal punishments and other constitutional issues lacking preexisting 
approaches to deference. This theory would also help promote transparent, 
deliberative government, while only modestly revising current doctrine. It 
is therefore both normatively desirable and practically achievable.  
I. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
A. Deference (Briefly) Defined 
Judicial deference generally requires a court to follow another 
governmental branch‘s decision, which the court may not have reached 
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independently.
36
 Courts generally defer to the political branches, either 
because of their political authority, epistemic authority, or both.
37
 In 
reviewing the political branches‘ actions, courts then consider both 
legislative policy and factual determinations.  
For better or worse, courts often conflate deference to policy judgments 
with deference to factual determinations.
38
 Strictly speaking, these are 
different kinds of judicial restraint; the familiar constitutional tiers of 
review are not necessarily an appropriate guide for judicial deference to 
legislative fact finding.
39
 Nor is judicial deference for one category 
necessarily predictive of whether courts will defer in the other. A court, for 
instance, could apply strict scrutiny to review of a governmental policy, 
while simultaneously deferring to the legislature‘s fact finding.40 
Similarly, a court could defer to a legislature‘s policy judgment regarding 
the importance of a governmental interest, while simultaneously viewing 
its factual findings with skepticism.
41
 
 
 
 36. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and 
Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 665 (2000) (―Judicial deference acknowledges 
that, based on the interpretation of another branch of government, a court might arrive at a conclusion 
different from one it would otherwise reach.‖).  
 37. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (plurality opinion) (deferring so as not 
to ―intrude‖ on state legislature‘s political authority and so that courts avoid ―ongoing scientific 
controversies beyond their expertise‖); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441–
42 (1985) (―[T]he courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our 
respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to 
what extent those interests should be pursued.‖); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–65 (1984) (explaining that ―policy arguments are more properly addressed to 
legislators or administrators, not to judges,‖ in part because administrators ―with great expertise‖ are in 
a ―better position‖ to make policy determinations); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 
(1976) (―[T]he judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of 
legislative policy determinations . . . .‖); Horwitz, supra note 10, at 1068 (explaining that judicial 
deference is often premised on legal or epistemic authority); infra Part III.A. Other kinds of deference, 
such as appellate court deference to trial court fact finding, are beyond the scope of this Article. See 
generally Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 233 (2009) (discussing standards of review generally).  
 38. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. 
L.J. 1, 12 (2009) (―Courts and commentators often conflate strict scrutiny . . . with judicial skepticism 
of legislative fact-finding . . . .‖); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We 
the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 151–52 (2001) (arguing that judicial deference to Congress typically 
includes both deference to Congress‘s ―choice of means to implement the Constitution‘s grants of 
power‖ and to its ―factual conclusions‖).  
 39. See Borgmann, supra note 38, at 8–10 (arguing that judicial review of legislative policies and 
facts should be treated as related, but distinct, inquiries).  
 40. Id. at 12; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–33 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny 
but deferring to law school‘s factual judgment that diversity is important to its educational mission).  
 41. Borgmann, supra note 38, at 12; see also City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (applying rational 
basis but finding that ordinance rested on ―irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded‖). 
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That being said, these formulations of deference have more, rather than 
less, in common with each other. The line between policy judgment and 
factual finding is not always clear, and, ultimately, deference in the name 
of either restrains the Court from rigorously reviewing the actions of the 
political branches. Despite important exceptions, courts tend to approach 
policy and factual judgments in a given case with similar degrees of 
deference, especially when their reasons for granting or not granting 
deference are unclear.
42
 This Article therefore defines ―deference‖ broadly 
to encompass judicial respect for both the political branches‘ policies and 
factual assumptions.  
B. Deference in Baze and Kennedy  
1. Brief Doctrinal Overview 
Two Kentucky death row inmates brought Baze v. Rees in state court 
against state officials, contending that Kentucky‘s lethal injection 
procedure created a substantial risk of excruciating pain in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.
43
 Kentucky‘s execution protocol consisted of three 
drugs: an anesthetic, a paralytic, and a fatal heart stopper.
44
 The plaintiffs 
argued that if the anesthetic failed to take effect, the paralytic would 
conceal excruciating pain caused by the third drug burning through the 
inmate‘s veins on the way to stop his heart.45 And because many states 
employ incompetent personnel to prepare and administer the drugs, the 
petitioners contended, the risk of error was, in fact, substantial.
46
  
 
 
 42. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2661–64 (2008) (appearing to apply 
heightened scrutiny and to make factual determinations against state); Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 
1531 (2008) (appearing to apply rational basis review and cautioning against embroiling courts in 
factual ―scientific controversies‖); Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1636 (2007) (appearing to 
relax scrutiny for review of laws restricting abortions and giving ―state and federal legislatures wide 
discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty‖); Emp‘t Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–90 (1990) (applying rational basis review to generally applicable, neutral 
laws burdening religion and assuming the fact that permitting religious exemptions to such laws would 
―court[] anarchy‖).  
 43. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1529. Though Baze originated in state court, most lethal injection 
challenges are actions brought in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Baze‘s analysis unquestionably 
applies to those § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 212 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(applying Baze to federal court § 1983 lethal injection challenge); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 
298–301 (4th Cir. 2008) (same).  
 44. See generally Berger, supra note 7, at 263–73 (discussing three-drug protocol); Deborah W. 
Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 56–58 (2007) [hereinafter Denno, Quandary] (discussing problems with three-
drug protocol).  
 45. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530.  
 46. See Brief for Petitioners at 12–24, Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (No. 07-5439).  
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Seven justices voted to reject the plaintiffs‘ challenge, but only Justices 
Kennedy and Alito joined Chief Justice Roberts‘s plurality opinion.47 The 
Chief Justice struck a highly deferential tone, emphasizing that judicial 
involvement in lethal injection ―would embroil the courts in ongoing 
scientific controversies beyond their expertise, and would substantially 
intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing their execution 
procedures.‖48 Articulating the new legal standard, he required that 
plaintiffs establish both that the current lethal injection procedure poses ―a 
substantial risk of serious harm‖ and that the state has refused to adopt a 
―feasible, readily implemented‖ alternative ―significantly‖ reducing that 
risk.
49
 Deprived of much discovery, the Kentucky plaintiffs failed on both 
counts.
50
 But rather than remand for more facts, the plurality not only 
upheld the Kentucky procedure but also sought to insulate other states‘ 
procedures from legal challenges. Specifically, it held that a ―[s]tate with a 
lethal injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold 
today would‖ pass constitutional muster.51 It then indicated that other 
states‘ procedures would meet this test.52 Baze thus tried to offer a kind of 
preemptive deference to states with three-drug protocols, even though the 
record in Kentucky was sparse and other states had encountered serious 
problems with their procedures.
53
  
Kennedy v. Louisiana reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal from 
the petitioner‘s trial, which culminated in his death sentence for the rape of 
his eight-year-old stepdaughter.
54
 Petitioner argued that his death sentence 
was unconstitutionally disproportionate to his crime, which had not 
resulted in the death of his victim.
55
 The Court agreed by a 5–4 vote, 
proceeding through several analyses to bolster its conclusion that capital 
 
 
 47. Consistent with Court precedent, this Article treats Chief Justice Roberts‘s plurality opinion 
as the Court‘s holding. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (―When a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.‖) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). But see Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment, 
and Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 217 (2009) (discussing difficulties of determining the 
―narrowest‖ opinion in Baze).  
 48. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (plurality opinion).  
 49. Id. at 1532.  
 50. See Berger, supra note 7, at 273–77 (discussing Baze plurality opinion).  
 51. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1537 (plurality opinion). 
 52. Id. (explaining that ―the standard we set forth here resolves more challenges than [Justice 
Stevens] acknowledges‖). 
 53. See Berger, supra note 7, at 268–73 (discussing problems with lethal injection procedures in 
California and Missouri).  
 54. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008).  
 55. Id. 
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punishment was disproportionate to the crime of child rape. First, the 
Court surveyed state practices and found that national consensus was 
against the death penalty for this offense.
56
 The Court then looked beyond 
state practices to its ―own judgment‖ and again found the punishment 
disproportionate.
57
 But while the Court did recognize the distinction 
between homicide and other violent crimes and ―the necessity to constrain 
the use of the death penalty,‖58 it opted not to rely primarily on these 
general, moral concerns.
59
 Instead, it engaged in ostensibly factual 
inquiries about the penalty‘s retributive and deterrent effects in this 
context.
60
 Drawing significantly on amicus briefs and social science 
research, the Court concluded that capital punishment did not effectively 
further either of these goals.
61
 In light of these factual findings, the Court 
found unconstitutional the application of the death penalty for child rape.  
2. Ostensible Similarities  
Both Baze and Kennedy asked whether particular state punitive 
practices violated the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishments as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In places, the Court engaged in similar analyses and quoted 
similar doctrinal language, discussing state counting, evolving standards 
of decency, and dignity. These ostensible similarities are significant 
because they create the illusion that the Court is consistently applying 
preexisting Eighth Amendment doctrine. On closer inspection, however, 
these similarities are only superficial. Indeed, the Court uses the language 
and doctrine in very different ways, resulting in heightened scrutiny in 
Kennedy and relaxed review in Baze.  
a. State Counting 
In both Baze and Kennedy, the Supreme Court engaged in ―state 
counting‖—surveying state practices to see how many states permit the 
challenged practice. At first glance, this survey seems to be a common 
 
 
 56. Id. at 2653.  
 57. Id. at 2658. 
 58. Id. at 2660.  
 59. Interestingly, a subsequent case construing Kennedy articulated the rule against capital 
punishment for nonhomicide crimes more firmly and categorically than Kennedy itself did. See 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) (―[T]he Court has concluded that capital punishment 
is impermissible for nonhomicide crimes against individuals.‖ (citing Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660)).  
 60. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2661–64. 
 61. See id. at 2662–64.  
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inquiry lending some consistency across the different lines of Eighth 
Amendment doctrine. On closer inspection, though, the Court‘s use of 
state counting in the two lines of cases is very different (and problematic, 
for different reasons). These differences both reflect and contribute to the 
dramatically different levels of deference.  
State counting is common in Eighth Amendment proportionality 
cases.
62
 Eighth Amendment doctrine looks to ―the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.‖63 In identifying 
these ―evolving standards of decency,‖ the Court has indicated at times 
that ―[t]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary 
values is the legislation enacted by the country‘s legislatures.‖64 
Accordingly, recent capital proportionality cases like Atkins v. Virginia,
65
 
Roper v. Simmons,
66
 and Kennedy all devote significant space to surveying 
state practices, identifying ―objective indicia of consensus against‖ capital 
punishment for, respectively, the mentally retarded, juveniles, and child 
rapists.
67
 For example, in Kennedy, the majority noted that forty-four 
states had not made child rape a capital offense; that the last individual 
executed for rape of a child was in 1964; and that only six of the thirty-
seven death penalty jurisdictions authorized capital punishment for child 
rape.
68
 Thus, explained the Court, the evidence tipped in favor of a 
national consensus against the death penalty for child rapists.
69
  
 
 
 62. See generally Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State 
Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2006) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court has consistently looked to state legislation to determine a national 
consensus in cases articulating the constitutional boundaries for application of the death penalty). For 
ease of presentation, I sometimes refer to capital proportionality cases as ―proportionality‖ cases, even 
though there is a separate doctrinal line of noncapital proportionality cases. See, e.g., Rachel E. 
Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case 
for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1146–47 (2009) [hereinafter Barkow, Two Tracks]. When 
discussing both sorts of proportionality cases, I distinguish them appropriately.  
 63. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 
(1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 64. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002). But see infra Part I.B.2.b.  
 65. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 66. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 67. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2651 (2008) (counting states permitting death 
penalty for child rape); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (surveying state statutes and noting ―evidence of 
national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles‖); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 (surveying states 
exempting the mentally retarded from capital punishment). A recent noncapital proportionality case 
also surveyed state practices. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023–25 (2010) (surveying 
states permitting life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders).  
 68. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2651–52. 
 69. Id.  
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This analysis might seem straightforward, but it is subject to 
manipulation. As an initial matter, given that the Court had already struck 
down the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman, state practices may 
not reflect national consensus so much as state legislatures‘ (correct) 
assumptions that capital punishment for any rape would rest on shaky 
constitutional ground.
70
 Assuming arguendo that state practices might 
reflect national consensus, the Court‘s approach to state counting in 
Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy is nevertheless methodologically inconsistent. 
In Atkins and Roper, the survey revealed that many states still engaged in 
the challenged practice. In Roper, twenty states lacked a formal 
prohibition on executing juveniles.
71
 In Atkins, twenty states permitted 
execution of the mentally retarded—and only eighteen death penalty states 
forbade it.
72
 Faced with survey results that arguably counseled against the 
outcome that the Court apparently desired, the majority in both cases 
noted that regardless of the straight numbers, it would also consider ―the 
consistency of the direction of change.‖73 The Court also argued that even 
in states permitting the execution of juveniles, ―the practice [was] 
infrequent.‖74  
These additional analyses give the Court great flexibility to find an 
approach that disfavors the state.
75
 If a straight count of states does not 
support the Court‘s desired conclusion, then perhaps related inquiries will. 
Indeed, in Kennedy, the Court found unpersuasive the trend toward 
making child rape a capital offense because relatively few states had made 
child rape a capital offense.
76
 The Court thus manipulates its state counting 
to highlight consensus against the challenged practice, even when 
consensus one way or another is not so clear.
77
  
 
 
 70. See id. at 2665 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that precedent ―stunted legislative 
consideration of the question‖).  
 71. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
 72. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321–22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 73. Roper, 543 U.S. at 566; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.  
 74. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
 75. But see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 17, 18 (2009) 
(arguing that the Court is ―casual about . . . how it counts states‖ because ―state-counting [is] a 
mechanism of judicial self-limitation‖).  
 76. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2656–57 (2008).  
 77. Justice Scalia, in particular, has argued that the Court‘s state counting is window-dressing, 
which the majority uses to conceal the fact that it is simply imposing its own values. Thus, when it 
came to light that the Court‘s survey of national practices in Kennedy had omitted the military law that 
does authorize death for child rape, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the case need not be 
reheard ―because the views of the American people on the death penalty for child rape were, to tell the 
truth, irrelevant to the majority‘s decision in this case.‖ Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2008) 
(Scalia, J., opinion respecting denial of petition for rehearing).  
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By contrast, Baze‘s use of state counting is exceedingly deferential. 
The Baze plurality opened by noting ―at the outset‖ that it would be 
difficult to strike down a method of execution that is so widely used.
78
 
Thirty-six states and the federal government, the plurality noted, have 
adopted lethal injection as the preferred method of execution, and most or 
all of those jurisdictions use the three-drug protocol.
79
 Given the 
prevalence of this protocol and the absence of any competing protocol, the 
plurality emphasized that it could not find Kentucky‘s method ―objectively 
intolerable.‖80 
At first glance, one could argue that state counting proves to be 
deferential in Baze simply because the survey of states clearly 
demonstrates a common practice. However, just as the Court‘s use of state 
counting in proportionality cases is questionable because it is so easily 
manipulated, so too is the state counting in Baze problematic because it is 
so unexamined. State counting is supposedly constitutionally relevant 
because it reflects national consensus. When courts striking down a 
challenged policy can point to evidence that it has been elsewhere rejected, 
they arguably mitigate the countermajoritarian problem.
81
 But in 
identifying the widespread use of the three-drug procedure, Baze offered 
no theory for why state practices should be probative. Legislatures often 
play little role in designing execution procedures, passing broad laws that 
punt authority to unelected Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, 
who usually operate in secrecy.
82
 As a result, neither the legislators 
themselves nor the public at large know anything about the procedure.
83
 It 
would therefore be odd to think that the number of states using the 
procedure is any indication of democratic consensus. Indeed, given that 
many state DOCs have blindly copied the procedure from each other 
 
 
 78. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (plurality opinion).  
 79. Id. at 1532.  
 80. Id. at 1534–35.  
 81. See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of ―Evolving Standards,‖ 57 UCLA L. REV. 
365, 369 (2009) (arguing that state counting in a variety of constitutional contexts demonstrates that 
the ―Court is an inherently majoritarian institution‖). 
 82. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-704 (2009) (―The penalty of death shall be inflicted by 
an intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death, 
under the supervision of the state department of corrections.‖); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-38 (2008) 
(proscribing similar guidelines); Berger, supra note 7, at 303 (discussing vague state statutes that ―punt 
authority‖ to state DOCs). 
 83. See, e.g., Katie Roth Heilman, Comment, Contemplating ―Cruel and Unusual‖: A Critical 
Analysis of Baze v. Rees in the Context of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment ―Proportionality‖ 
Jurisprudence, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 633, 653 (2009) (arguing that the plurality‘s assertion regarding 
lethal injection‘s ubiquity is not especially relevant given that the public knows very little about the 
procedure). 
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without assessing its dangers, state counting creates a perverse rule that 
rewards states for copying a procedure without assessing its risks.
84
  
The plurality‘s use of state counting also misconstrued the issue 
presented. Plaintiffs in lethal injection actions like Baze did not challenge 
lethal injection or even the three-drug protocol per se. Rather, they 
challenged the procedure‘s details. Properly implemented, the three-drug 
protocol is presumably painless; improperly implemented, it is 
excruciating.
85
 Accordingly, the safety—and, hence, constitutionality—of 
the procedure rides on the details of each state‘s implementation. But state 
DOCs implement the protocols in dramatically different ways.
86
 
Therefore, the fact that many other states have adopted the three-drug 
protocol, as Baze emphasized, is probative of very little, given the terrific 
variation among those states‘ practices and the constitutional relevance of 
those variations. Accordingly, just as proportionality cases like Kennedy 
suspiciously manipulate state counting to help justify striking down state 
practices, so too did the Baze plurality find state counting probative to 
justify judicial deference, when closer examination would have seriously 
called into question its relevance.
87
  
b. Evolving Standards of Decency  
Under contemporary doctrine, the Eighth Amendment‘s meaning must 
be consistent with ―‗evolving standards of decency.‘‖88 As we have seen, 
 
 
 84. See, e.g., Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 895–98 (M.D. Tenn. 2007), vacated, 571 
F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2009) (recounting Tennessee‘s decision to follow other states‘ practices despite 
significant evidence that alternative methods were far safer); Teresa A. Zimmers & Leonidas G. 
Koniaris, Peer-Reviewed Studies Identifying Problems in the Design and Implementation of Lethal 
Injection for Execution, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919, 921 (2008) (arguing that states performed no 
research ―whatsoever‖ to determine risks of lethal injection when they adopted the procedure). 
 85. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 7, at 265–66 (describing three-drug protocol).  
 86. Compare Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1039–45 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (describing 
the risks of California lethal injection protocol, including data from execution logs indicating that 
executions did not proceed as intended), with Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 882–92 (describing the 
risks of Tennessee‘s lethal injection protocol, including failure to check consciousness, failure to select 
adequately trained executioners, and failure to monitor administration of drugs), and Taylor v. 
Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *3–6 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (describing the risks of 
Missouri‘s lethal injection protocol, including dyslexic doctor mixing drugs).  
 87. Cf. Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 25–36 (2007) [hereinafter Lain, 
Deciding Death] (discussing the use of state counting and statistics in Atkins and Roper and 
determining that the Justices‘ views, not the legitimate use of statistics, accounted for the outcomes); 
Joshua L. Shapiro, And Unusual: Examining the Forgotten Prong of the Eighth Amendment, 38 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 465, 477–80 (2008) (arguing that in capital punishment cases, the Court has used 
statistics in a ―results-oriented and undisciplined manner‖).  
 88. E.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 
(1958)). This inquiry typically operates as an ―irreversible ratchet,‖ forbidding states from reversing 
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state counting has long been considered an important component of the 
―evolving standards‖ inquiry,89 but courts have applied the principle 
inconsistently. Indeed, despite the conventional wisdom that the evolving 
standards inquiry is largely determined by state counting, the Court in 
Kennedy actually discussed the two separately. When the Court surveyed 
the states‘ child rape laws in Part III of its opinion, it did not once mention 
―evolving standards of decency.‖90 Instead, in Part IV, where the Court 
explored its ―own judgment,‖ it explained that ―[e]volving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society counsel us to be most 
hesitant before interpreting the Eighth Amendment to allow the extension 
of the death penalty.‖91 In other words, the Court apparently treated the 
―evolving standards‖ requirement as an invitation, not only to look for 
objective indicia of a national consensus in Part III, but also to ascertain its 
own independent judgment in Part IV as to the propriety of the death 
penalty in particular circumstances. Thus, the Kennedy Court reasoned that 
―[i]t is an established principle that [evolving standards of] decency, in 
[their] essence, presume[] respect for the individual and thus moderation 
or restraint in the application of capital punishment.‖92  
Far from limiting the Court to an (arguably) objective survey of 
contemporary practices, the ―evolving standards of decency‖ inquiry, then, 
invited the Court to make its own judgment as to the propriety of the death 
penalty—that is, to substitute Louisiana‘s legislative judgments with its 
own. As part of its own inquiry, the Court ―insist[ed] upon confining the 
instances in which capital punishment may be imposed.‖93 It also 
explained that ―[c]onsistent with evolving standards of decency . . . there 
is a distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand 
and nonhomicide crimes against individual persons, including child rape, 
on the other.‖94 In other words, the Court used ―evolving standards‖ to 
make its own judgment that the death penalty should be limited and that 
 
 
the Court‘s determinations. Jacobi, supra note 62, at 1119–23.  
 89. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (explaining that proportionality review 
under ―evolving standards‖ should be informed by ―objective factors‖ and that the most reliable 
evidence is ―legislation enacted by the country‘s legislatures‖ (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 1000 (1991))); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 279, 331 (1987) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Jacobi, supra note 62, at 1091 (explaining that the Court has indicated that the clearest 
evidence of contemporary values to ascertain evolving standards is state legislation); supra notes 63–
64 and accompanying text.  
 90. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2651–58 (2008) (surveying state penalties for 
child rape but not mentioning ―evolving standards of decency‖).  
 91. Id. at 2658.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 2659.  
 94. Id. at 2660. 
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there was a moral difference between murder and nonhomicide crimes. 
This use of ―evolving standards‖ may go beyond other proportionality 
cases‘ reliance on that concept as an invitation to count states, but the 
approach nevertheless fits more generally with the Court‘s rigorous review 
in proportionality cases.  
By contrast, Baze‘s consideration of evolving standards counsels for 
deference. The plurality explained that ―[o]ur society has . . . steadily 
moved to more humane methods of carrying out capital punishment.‖95 It 
then recounted the evolution of methods of execution: ―firing squad, 
hanging, the electric chair, . . . the gas chamber, [and, finally,] lethal 
injection.‖96 But rather than suggesting that these evolving practices gave 
the Court license to intrude on the states‘ judgment, the plurality argued 
that the states themselves, without judicial interference, have progressed 
―toward more humane methods of execution.‖97 ―[O]ur approval of a 
particular method in the past,‖ the plurality concluded, ―has not precluded 
legislatures from taking the steps they deem appropriate, in light of new 
developments, to ensure humane capital punishment.‖98 Thus, whereas 
Kennedy cited ―evolving standards‖ to empower the Court to constrain the 
death penalty by striking down a state‘s practice, Baze essentially said that 
courts should leave states alone to evolve as they wish.
99
 The Court‘s 
contradictory approaches to evolving practices reflect, once again, 
opposing views of judicial deference.  
c. Dignity 
Both Baze and Kennedy also reference ―dignity,‖ but they use that 
word very differently. In proportionality cases, ―dignity‖ bolsters the 
individual‘s Eighth Amendment protection and invites the Court to engage 
in rigorous review of the state‘s policy. In Kennedy, the Court emphasized 
that law must ―express respect for the dignity of the person, and the 
punishment of criminals must conform to that rule.‖100 Kennedy thus made 
clear that it would focus primarily on the interests of the condemned. This 
view of ―dignity‖ is consistent with earlier proportionality cases. Roper, 
for instance, noted that ―[b]y protecting even those convicted of heinous 
 
 
 95. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1538 (2008) (plurality opinion).  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. See id. at 1527 (arguing that states have been ―motivated by a desire to find a more humane 
alternative to then-existing methods‖). 
 100. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008).  
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crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to 
respect the dignity of all persons.‖101 The Court in proportionality cases 
thus conceives of the condemned as the Eighth Amendment-right holder 
and focused on his dignity interest, contributing further to its heightened 
scrutiny.
102
  
By contrast, Baze‘s attention to ―dignity‖ focuses not on the 
condemned but on ―[t]he [state‘s] interest in preserving the dignity of the 
procedure, especially where convulsions or seizures could be 
misperceived as signs of consciousness or distress.‖103 Petitioners had 
argued that Kentucky should eliminate the paralytic ―because it serves no 
therapeutic purpose while suppressing muscle movements that could 
reveal an inadequate administration of the first drug.‖104 The plurality 
responded, however, that the paralytic ―prevents involuntary physical 
movements during unconsciousness that may accompany the injection of 
potassium chloride‖ and that Kentucky‘s interest in the ―dignity of the 
procedure‖ outweighed the risk that the paralytic would conceal 
excruciating pain.
105
 Remarkably, this analysis suggests that the State’s 
aesthetic interest in a peaceful-looking procedure trumps the inmate‘s 
interest in a transparent procedure that would more easily reveal errors of 
administration and intense pain. In other words, under Baze, the ―dignity‖ 
inquiry apparently prioritizes the State‘s interest in the witnesses‘ 
experiences (i.e., whether they are viewing an execution that looks 
peaceful) over the inmate‘s experience (i.e., whether he feels pain). 
Appearances are more important than reality. Baze and Kennedy‘s 
conflicting uses of the word ―dignity‖ highlight, once again, internal 
contradictions within the Eighth Amendment doctrine. Baze and Kennedy 
not only come to opposite outcomes, but rest on different theories of 
whose interests—whose ―dignity‖—is primary here.  
 
 
 101. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). 
 102. Cf. Judith Resnik, Law as Affiliation: ―Foreign‖ Law, Democratic Federalism, and the 
Sovereigntism of the Nation-State, 6 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 33, 52 (2008) (arguing that since World War II 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United States Supreme Court has relied on the 
term ―‗dignity‘ to enhance constitutional protections for individuals and [has] embed[ded] the concept 
into . . . the Bill of Rights,‖ including the Eighth Amendment). 
 103. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1535 (2008) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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3. Doctrinal Divergence and the Treatment of Facts 
Another crucial difference between Kennedy and Baze is the Court‘s 
approach to the facts. As Judge Jerome Frank once noted, ―[i]f you 
scrutinize a legal rule, you will see that it is a conditional statement 
referring to facts.‖106 Legal rules, then, are operative only to the extent that 
they are applied to facts. As a result, deference involves not just the 
doctrinal test courts articulate but also the way they approach the relevant 
facts.
107
  
The Court adopted nearly opposite attitudes toward the background 
facts in Baze and Kennedy. Whereas Kennedy drew liberally from amicus 
briefs and social science research, Baze downplayed such sources, 
especially those suggesting serious problems with the three-drug 
procedure in other states.
108
 In Baze, the Court crafted a far-reaching, 
deferential legal standard, despite the dearth of evidence in that case. The 
factual record in Baze was sparse, a point the petitioners emphasized in 
their briefs.
109
 The plaintiffs had been denied important discovery, 
including depositions, which prevented them from learning about the 
execution team‘s responsibilities and competence.110 Given that the safety 
of the procedure hinges significantly on the competence of the people 
executing it,
 
this denial obscured key information about how the procedure 
actually worked in practice.
111
 Additionally, only one Kentucky prisoner 
 
 
 106. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 14 (1949). 
 107. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 100 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (―How a court describes its standard of review when a prison regulation infringes fundamental 
constitutional rights often has far less consequence for the inmates than the actual showing that the 
court demands of the State in order to uphold the regulation.‖); supra Part I.A (explaining the 
connection between standards of review and judicial attitudes towards legislative fact-finding); infra 
Part III.C.  
 108. See Brief for Michael Morales et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8–28, Baze v. 
Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (No. 07-5439) [hereinafter Morales Amicus Brief] (arguing that ―public, 
undisputed facts from multiple jurisdictions reveal a pervasive lack of professionalism in the 
development of protocols and the selection, training, and oversight of execution team members‖) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 109. See Brief for Petitioners at 20, 43–46, 59–60, Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (No. 07-
5439) (discussing Kentucky‘s lack of a track record with lethal injection, and the Kentucky courts‘ 
failure to address issues in the record, and contending that because the record was created under an 
erroneous legal standard, the lower courts should reevaluate it).  
 110. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16 n.2, Baze, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (No. 07-5439) (discussing 
trial court‘s denial of depositions). 
 111. For example, in Missouri, crucial evidence regarding the execution team leader‘s 
incompetence and departures from the State‘s stated procedure was discovered through a deposition. 
See Deposition of John Doe No. 1 at 20, Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. 
Mo. June 5, 2006) [hereinafter Doe Deposition]; Berger, supra note 7, at 268–70 (discussing Doe 
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had ever been executed by lethal injection,
112
 so there were few execution 
records shedding light on the procedure.
113
  
The plurality was untroubled by these gaps in the record. It explained 
that, whatever the facts, courts should not embroil themselves ―in ongoing 
scientific controversies beyond their expertise . . . .‖114 The plurality also 
refused to look at well-established outside facts presented in amicus briefs 
shedding light on problems with lethal injection in other states.
115
 
In light of these limitations, the plurality might have written a narrow 
opinion either remanding the case for more fact finding or rejecting the 
plaintiffs‘ Eighth Amendment action on the basis of the sparse record. Or 
the Court might have granted certiorari in a different case with a more 
developed record.
116
 Instead, the Baze plurality framed its analysis 
broadly, focusing on the written protocol instead of the details of 
implementation. The plurality praised the protocol‘s call for an IV team to 
establish both primary and backup lines, its inclusion of a phlebotomist, 
and the presence of officials in the execution chamber to watch for signs 
of IV problems.
117
 While this attention is understandable, complete focus 
on the written protocol creates the false impression that the procedure‘s 
safety can be discerned within the four corners of the document.
118
 The 
protocol‘s safeguards do weigh in favor of constitutionality, but the 
plurality nowhere explained that a written protocol has little value if it is 
 
 
Deposition). Thus, the denial of the deposition in Baze quite possibly obscured similar important 
information about Kentucky‘s lethal injection procedure. 
 112. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1528.  
 113. By comparison, other states‘ execution records sometimes reveal serious problems. In 
Missouri, for instance, the record revealed that the State had varied the amount of anesthetic prepared 
for some executions. See Letter from Defendants to Judge Fernando Gaitan (May 17, 2006), Taylor v. 
Crawford, No. 05-4173 (apologizing for the State‘s misstatements to the court about anesthetic dose). 
 114. Baze, 128 S. Ct at 1531 (plurality opinion).  
 115. See Morales Amicus Brief, supra note 108, at 8–35 (recounting problems in various states‘ 
lethal injection procedures).  
 116. Had the Court wanted to decide a method-of-execution case with a substantially more 
developed record, it could have granted certiorari in Taylor v. Crawford, a Missouri lethal injection 
challenge with a much more thorough trial record. See Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 
1779035, at *3–8 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (recounting problems with Missouri procedure). That it 
chose not to do so suggests that some justices preferred articulating an Eighth Amendment standard 
without the benefit of factual background. See Berger, supra note 7, at 279 n.102.  
 117. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533–34.  
 118. Mere qualifications are inadequate to ensure that execution team members will competently 
perform their duties. In Missouri, for example, a surgeon failed to mix the drugs properly and perform 
other tasks crucial to humane lethal injection. See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *4–7 (discussing 
surgeon‘s mistakes in lethal injection). Moreover, Baze only addressed IV access, not the skills needed 
for other steps of the procedure, such as mixing the drugs, injecting the drugs, and monitoring 
anesthetic depth. See Berger, supra note 7, at 263–73 (discussing protocol‘s steps).  
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not faithfully and competently carried out. Nor did the plurality concede 
that other states have deviated substantially from their own protocols.
119
  
The plurality further minimized the importance of implementation in 
its discussion of accidents. Relying on the Court‘s 1947 decision in 
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
120
 the plurality explained that 
―accidents happen for which no man is to blame‖121 and that, ―while 
regrettable,‖ such an ―isolated mishap . . . does not [violate] the Eighth 
Amendment‖ because it does not ―give[] rise to a ‗substantial risk of 
serious harm.‘‖122 This attention to Resweber is significant because it 
further downplays implementation. More precisely, the plurality‘s use of 
Resweber apparently assumes that the Court will be able to distinguish 
between ―an innocent misadventure,‖123 which would not create an Eighth 
Amendment problem, and an ―‗objectively intolerable risk of harm‘ that 
officials may not ignore.‖124 In some circumstances, this assumption may 
be correct; a problem might arise that is so unforeseeable that it can be 
fairly termed an accident ―for which no man is to blame.‖125 But method-
of-execution challenges are primarily about risk,
126
 and the plaintiffs‘ main 
contention is that the states‘ procedures create too much risk—that is, too 
great a possibility of accident. And because much of the risk stems from 
unqualified personnel, it is impossible to know exactly what will go 
wrong. Incompetent personnel can make numerous kinds of errors, some 
unpredictable. The plurality seems to suggest that unexpected errors might 
be excusable, a position that would absolve the State of responsibility over 
unexpected harms caused by incompetent personnel, even though it was 
very predictable that such personnel would cause some error. By 
emphasizing that ―isolated mishap[s]‖ do not violate the Eighth 
Amendment and by then proceeding to examine Kentucky‘s written 
 
 
 119. See Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (―[I]mplementation of 
California‘s lethal-injection protocol lacks both reliability and transparency.‖); Taylor, 2006 WL 
1779035, at *4–7 (explaining that Missouri execution team leader sua sponte ―modified the protocol 
on several occasions in the past‖).  
 120. 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (plurality opinion).  
 121. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (quoting Resweber, 329 U.S. at 462) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 122. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)).  
 123. Id. (quoting Resweber, 329 U.S. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 124. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846).  
 125. Id. (quoting Resweber, 329 U.S. at 462).  
 126. See, e.g., Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531–32 (requiring, inter alia, a substantial risk of harm for an 
Eighth Amendment violation); see also Evans v. Saar, 412 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524 (D. Md. 2006) (asking 
―whether an inmate facing execution has shown that he is subject to an unnecessary risk of 
unconstitutional pain or suffering‖) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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protocol (but not its actual practices), the plurality ignored the facts on 
which the plaintiffs‘ case turned.127  
Far from being troubled by the limited record, then, the Baze plurality 
exploited the factual gaps to create a standard deferential to the state. It 
even emphasized that that standard was not tethered to the facts of the 
Kentucky protocol, holding that a state protocol ―substantially similar‖ to 
Kentucky‘s would pass constitutional muster.128 It further insisted that this 
standard would apply broadly and resolve other lethal injection 
challenges.
129
 All of this amounted to a preemptive deference, a wide-
reaching deferential standard that not only ignored gaps in the record to 
defer to the State in the instant case but also insisted on applying that 
deference to other cases, with insufficient regard to factual differences.  
By sharp contrast, following cases like Atkins and Roper, the Court in 
Kennedy relied heavily on facts provided by amici or social science 
research to strike down the challenged state practice. Whereas Baze 
cautioned that courts should not interfere with the political branches‘ 
scientific judgment and ignored some important supplemental amicus 
briefs, Kennedy saw no problem with reviewing extensive social science 
data and using it to second guess the political branches‘ judgment. Indeed, 
the Court repeatedly looked outside the case for crucial evidence about 
existing state laws;
130
 pending state legislation;
131
 jury practices;
132
 the 
hardships that testimony imposes on rape victims;
133
 the annual number of 
incidents of child rape compared to the annual number of murders;
134
 the 
percentage of first-degree murderers sentenced to death;
135
 the permanent 
psychological effect rape has on a child;
136
 the infrequency of the death 
 
 
 127. As Professor Denno argues, the Baze plurality‘s use of Resweber is also problematic because 
it quotes Resweber‘s discussion of due process and double jeopardy issues to articulate the substantive 
Eighth Amendment standard. See Deborah W. Denno, When Willie Francis Died: The ―Disturbing‖ 
Story Behind One of the Eighth Amendment’s Most Enduring Standards of Risk, in DEATH PENALTY 
STORIES 17, 91 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009) (criticizing Chief Justice Roberts‘s 
use of Resweber in Baze). 
 128.  Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1537. 
 129. See id. (―[T]he standard we set forth here resolves more challenges than [Justice Stevens] 
acknowledges.‖).  
 130. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2651–52 (2008) (discussing state child rape 
laws). 
 131. See id. at 2656–57 (discussing pending legislation). 
 132. See id. at 2651–58 (surveying state laws, jury practices, and other relevant information to 
assess state practices). 
 133. See id. at 2662 (noting hardship imposed by testimony and citing amicus brief).  
 134. See id. at 2660 (citing social science research).  
 135. See id. (citing empirical study). 
 136. See id. at 2658 (citing several studies).  
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penalty for child rape and other nonhomicide crimes;
137
 systemic concerns 
related to the ―unreliable, induced, and even imagined child testimony‖;138 
the problem of underreporting with respect to child sexual abuse;
139
 the 
fear of negative consequences for the perpetrator as a reason for 
nondisclosure;
140
 and the death penalty‘s removal of a ―strong incentive 
for the rapist not to kill the victim.‖141 These factors were clearly central to 
the majority‘s argument that the Louisiana policy did not comport with 
―evolving standards of decency‖ and did not further legitimate penological 
interests of retribution and deterrence.  
Kennedy‘s treatment of the deterrence question in particular highlights 
the contrast with Baze. The Court questioned whether capital punishment 
for child rape actually was a deterrent. Specifically, it contended that 
capital punishment‘s deterrent effects in this context were questionable 
because it ―adds to the risk of non-reporting‖ and ―may remove a strong 
incentive for the rapist not to kill the victim.‖142 But the Court‘s factual 
suppositions rested on extremely shaky ground. With regards to 
nonreporting, the Court itself conceded that ―we know little about what 
differentiates those who report from those who do not report.‖143 As for 
the potential murder of the victim, the Court‘s conclusion was similarly 
tentative, positing only that capital punishment ―may remove . . . incentive 
. . . not to kill the victim.‖144 The Court, then, had precious little to support 
its factual conclusions, and yet it still relied on them to conclude that 
―punishment by death may not result in more deterrence.‖145 
Kennedy‘s approach to facts, then, was strikingly undeferential. In 
addition to striking down Louisiana‘s statute on the basis of shaky 
conclusions drawn from uncertain data, the Court never explained why its 
factual determinations should override the legislature‘s moral and factual 
judgments that capital punishment was appropriate here. Of course, there 
may be good reasons for the Court to distrust democracy in this context 
and to prioritize its own epistemic concerns over the legislature‘s political 
 
 
 137. See id. at 2657–58 (discussing statistics).  
 138. See id. at 2663 (citing several studies and amicus brief).  
 139. See id. (citing several studies).  
 140. See id. at 2663–64 (citing several studies).  
 141. Id. at 2664 (citing law review article).  
 142. Id. at 2663–64.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 2664.  
 145. Id. (emphasis added).  
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authority. But the Court‘s failure to acknowledge or justify its 
undeferential approach to the facts is striking.
146
  
II. DRIVING THE DISJOINTED DOCTRINE 
A. ―Who‖ vs. ―How‖ 
Before attempting to resolve the vastly different levels of deference in 
Baze and Kennedy, we should first try to understand why the Court 
approaches these Eighth Amendment cases so differently. The easiest 
explanation is that these cases are just about different subjects. The 
proportionality cases look at whom the penalty targets. The method-of-
execution cases ask how punishment is imposed. The Court may afford 
different levels of deference, then, simply because it cares more about 
―who‖ than ―how.‖  
This bias against method-of-execution claims may be driven partially 
by the fact that states usually adopt new execution methods to make 
executions more humane.
147
 Given that lethal injection looks humane from 
a distance—and, as Baze points out, was actually adopted ―to find a more 
humane alternative to then-existing methods‖148—a common reaction is 
that this litigation is frivolous.
149
 Of course, upon closer review, this 
reaction dissipates, especially when observers realize that states paralyze 
inmates to conceal potential problems. Nevertheless, initial reactions often 
shape judges‘ approaches toward these cases and deter a hard look at the 
details of lethal injection.
150
 By contrast, it is far easier to quickly 
recognize (if not necessarily agree with) the moral difficulty with 
executing someone who did not take a life; the punishment, to many, may 
look harsher than the crime. To this extent, the level of deference might be 
explained less by legal distinctions and more by the intuitive reactions that 
 
 
 146. See infra Part III.C.2.  
 147. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1538 (2008) (plurality opinion) (―The firing squad, hanging, 
the electric chair, and the gas chamber have each in turn given way to more humane methods, 
culminating in today‘s consensus on lethal injection.‖).  
 148. Id. at 1527 n.1.  
 149. See, e.g., Jeremy Fogel, In the Eye of the Storm: A Judge’s Experience in Lethal-Injection 
Litigation, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 735, 736 (2008) (recounting by the judge that his initial reaction to 
lethal injection claim was ―extremely skeptical‖). 
 150. See id.; Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Challenges Facing Society in the Implementation of the 
Death Penalty, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 763, 765 (2008) (explaining that, as a judge, he had assumed 
incorrectly upon being assigned a lethal injection case that the lethal injection procedure was designed 
and implemented with due diligence and trained personnel).  
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people (including judges) experience when they first confront questions of 
this sort.  
Judges may also worry that involvement in method-of-execution cases 
would be too onerous.
151
 Drawing on remedial concerns, Baze emphasized 
that ―the wide range of ‗judgment calls‘ that meet constitutional and 
statutory requirements are confided to officials outside of the Judicial 
Branch of Government.‖152 The Baze plurality apparently feared that 
striking down a lethal injection procedure would require courts to oversee 
the design of future procedures, and it did not want judges to wade into 
such territory.
153
 By contrast, striking down the application of the death 
penalty to a narrow class of offenders does not require much further 
judicial administration.
154
 
The Court, however, never explicitly stated that it cared more about 
―who‖ than ―how,‖ either due to merits or remedial concerns. Indeed, the 
preference seems contrary to recent constitutional methodology. To the 
extent that the Court has looked to originalism in recent constitutional 
cases (particularly in cases of near-first impression
155
), the original 
understanding of the Eighth Amendment would likely cut against the 
Court‘s preference. It is doubtful that the original understanding of the 
Eighth Amendment prioritized the ―who‖ over the ―how‖—or, in fact, 
cared much about the ―who‖ at all.156 To the contrary, banning certain 
tortures was likely the primary motivation behind the Amendment.
157
  
 
 
 151. To this extent, the Court‘s reluctance might be rooted in skepticism about judicial remedies 
in civil rights litigation more generally. See generally Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (denying 
equitable relief against city police officers); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) 
(―[F]ederal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison 
administration.‖); Berger, supra note 7, at 280–301 (arguing that remedial concerns significantly shape 
courts‘ approaches to lethal injection).  
 152. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531–32 (2008) (plurality opinion) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)).  
 153. See id. at 1531–32 (warning that judiciary should not ―intrude on the role of state legislatures 
in implementing their execution procedures‖).  
 154. See infra Part II.C.  
 155. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (relying on original 
understanding of Second Amendment to hold that Second Amendment protects individual right to bear 
arms independent of service in militia).  
 156. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 334–35 (1972) (noting that English law at the 
time of America‘s founding included numerous capital crimes and that while capital crimes were less 
numerous in the colonies, in the 18th century, the average colony still had 12 capital crimes); John F. 
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of ―Unusual‖: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel 
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2008) (discussing original understanding of Eighth 
Amendment). 
 157. See, e.g., Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the 
Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 666 (2004) (arguing that among the Eighth Amendment‘s 
original purposes was to prohibit ―the use of torture for the purpose of eliciting confessions‖ (quoting 
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Similarly, the Court might have justified the discrepancy by concluding 
that the Baze policy better served ―legitimate penological interests‖ than 
the Kennedy policy.
158
 Kennedy, after all, offered no deference, in part 
because it concluded that imposing the death penalty for child rape did not 
serve the penological interests of retribution or deterrence.
159
 Baze, 
however, did not examine whether potentially painful executions serve a 
more legitimate penological interest, such as reflecting society‘s disdain 
for the condemned‘s crime or deterring more crime, than painless 
executions. To the contrary, Baze‘s analysis seems to take for granted that 
civilized societies do not inflict gratuitous pain even on those sentenced to 
death.
160
 In other words, ―legitimate penological interests‖ cannot justify 
the doctrinal discrepancy here because Baze did not engage in that 
analysis.
161
  
As for the remedial concerns, the Court overstates the intrusiveness of 
lethal injection remedies. Contrary to the Court‘s arguments, modest 
remedies could have greatly reduced the risk of pain without intruding on 
the State‘s prerogative.162 For example, a one-drug protocol greatly 
reduces the risk of pain, but the plurality summarily rejected this option as 
unworkable, even though the record was silent on the issue and extensive 
evidence indicates that it is safer than the three-drug procedure.
163
 Indeed, 
Ohio and Washington recently each adopted the one-drug approach sua 
sponte, a development that strongly suggests that the plurality did not take 
 
 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 260 n.2 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Stinneford, 
supra note 156, at 1809 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment originally prohibited innovation in 
punishment because of its potential to lead to torture).  
 158. See Sara Colón, Capital Crime: How California’s Administration of the Death Penalty 
Violates the Eighth Amendment, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1377, 1383–85 (2009) (arguing that capital 
punishment in California is no more retributive or deterrent than a life-without-parole sentence and 
thus violates the Eighth Amendment because there must be penological justification to implement one 
method of punishment over another); Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1375–79 (2008) (emphasizing that the state‘s ―[p]enological 
purposes . . . are central to the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis‖).  
 159. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2662–64 (2008); supra Part I.B.3; infra Part 
III.C.2.  
 160. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1530–37 (2008) (discussing risk of pain and assuming that 
too high a risk would trigger a constitutional problem).  
 161. Moreover, to the extent that the concept did play a role in Kennedy, the Court‘s analysis is 
idiosyncratic enough that it would appear to apply only in that case. See infra Part III.C.2.  
 162. Berger, supra note 7, at 314–26; see also Ty Alper, The Truth About Physician Participation 
in Lethal Injection Executions, 88 N.C. L. REV. 11, 19–49 (2009) (arguing that physician participation 
is a workable remedy).  
 163. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534, 1538 (concluding that the one-drug protocol has ―problems of 
its own‖ even though the record was undeveloped on this point); Berger, supra note 7, at 315–18 
(discussing advantages of the one-drug protocol). 
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this option seriously enough.
164
 In other words, the Court‘s reluctance to 
examine the ―how‖ rested partially on incorrect assumptions about the 
remedial options.  
B. Precedent 
A related attempted explanation of the doctrinal discrepancy focuses on 
the different lines of precedent. The Court has never found a method of 
execution to violate the Eighth Amendment.
165
 By contrast, in 
proportionality cases, the Court has frequently invalidated the application 
of the death penalty to certain classes of crimes and criminals.
166
 To this 
extent, Baze and Kennedy are not outliers but examples of an ongoing 
discrepancy in Eighth Amendment doctrine.  
Precedent, however, is an insufficient justification for the discrepancy. 
For one, the doctrinal lines are not insular. As noted above, even Baze and 
Kennedy use similar language and tests.
167
 Furthermore, Baze did not limit 
its discussion of precedent to other method-of-execution cases (Louisiana 
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, In re Kemmler, and Wilkerson v. Utah) but 
also discussed prison condition cases, as well as state counting and 
evolving standards—inquiries more typically associated with 
proportionality cases.
168
 Thus, even if the precedential lines are somewhat 
 
 
 164. See Respondents‘ Motion to Dismiss as Moot the Claims that the Three Drug Protocol is 
Unconstitutional, Stenson v. Vail, No. 83828-3 (Wash. Mar. 2, 2010) (moving to dismiss suit as moot 
because the State replaced three-drug procedure with safer one-drug procedure); Defendants‘ Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Cooey v. Strickland, No. 04-1156 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2009) (moving 
for summary judgment because the State replaced three-drug procedure with safer one-drug 
procedure).  
 165. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530 (plurality opinion); see also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 
329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (permitting the State to electrocute inmate after initial attempt at 
electrocution failed); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (upholding execution by 
electrocution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134–37 (1878) (upholding constitutionality of 
execution by firing squad). 
 166. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–60 (2005) (invalidating death penalty for 
individuals who were under eighteen when they committed capital crimes); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (invalidating death penalty for mentally retarded individuals); Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789–93 (1982) (invalidating death penalty for one aider and abettor of felony 
who ―did not take life, attempt to take [life], or intend to take life‖); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 
593–96 (1977) (invalidating death penalty for rape of adult woman).  
 167. See supra Part I.B.2.  
 168. Another potential explanation for Baze‘s deference is that the Court views method-of-
execution challenges as roughly analogous to prison condition cases, in which the judiciary has 
historically afforded the political branches great deference. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531–32, 1537 
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33–35 
(1993)); Berger, supra note 7, at 284–85, 296–301 (discussing lethal injection cases in light of prison 
condition precedent). After all, like method-of-execution claims, prison condition actions challenge 
not the fact of the sentence, but the way in which the sentence is carried out, and therefore fall within 
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distinct,
169
 the Court does not treat them as wholly separate.  
Moreover, the Court arguably has not even followed its own precedent, 
at least in the proportionality context. When the Court in Roper forbade 
execution of murderers who had committed their capital crime while 
minors, it essentially overruled its 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, 
which had held that the execution of minors who had committed murder 
was not per se ―cruel and unusual.‖170 Similarly, Atkins basically overruled 
Penry v. Lynaugh‘s holding that the execution of the mentally retarded did 
not violate the Eighth Amendment.
171
 Of course, one could argue that 
evolving standards mandated new outcomes in Roper and Atkins.
172
 But, 
as Justice Scalia countered, the meaning of the Eighth Amendment itself 
changed with these new decisions, in part because the Court did not follow 
well-established methodologies.
173
 For instance, Roper departed from 
Stanford and other earlier cases in counting not just death-penalty states 
excluding juveniles from capital punishment but also states abandoning 
the death penalty altogether.
174
 Regardless of the propriety of these 
different approaches to state counting, the discrepancy belies doctrinal 
consistency. To this extent, the outcomes in proportionality cases can be 
 
 
the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 580 (2006); Nelson v. 
Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004). However, this explanation inadequately justifies the Court‘s 
different approaches in Baze and Kennedy. Though method-of-execution and prison condition claims 
can both be properly filed under § 1983, courts typically defer in prison condition cases because prison 
officials, unlike judges, understand issues of prison security. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337, 362 (1981) (―[C]ourts have been especially deferential to prison authorities in the adoption and 
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and 
discipline and to maintain institutional security.‖ (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979))). 
By contrast, many officials carrying out lethal injection enjoy no such expertise. See infra Part III.C.1. 
Moreover, given the logic of Hill and Nelson, it would be odd for the Court to grant more deference in 
cases challenging the fact of one‘s sentence than in cases merely challenging how that sentence can be 
carried out. To be sure, Hill and Nelson only determined the line between habeas and § 1983—not the 
substantive standards for cases brought under either procedural vehicle—but their analyses seem to 
presuppose that challenges to the legitimacy of the sentence itself are somehow more intrusive on state 
prerogatives. See, e.g., Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643 (explaining that civil rights suits under § 1983 do not 
extend ―where an inmate seeks injunctive relief challenging the fact of his conviction or the duration 
of his sentence‖).  
 169. Compare Helling, 509 U.S. at 33 (requiring deliberate indifference in prison health 
challenge), with Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1525–38 (not requiring finding of deliberate indifference).  
 170. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005).  
 171. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989). 
 172. For example, the Court in Atkins explained that when it decided Penry in 1989, only two 
death-penalty states prohibited execution of the mentally retarded, whereas by 2002, sixteen more 
death-penalty states had adopted such measures. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–15 (2002).  
 173. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―[T]he meaning of 
our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years . . . .‖).  
 174. See id. at 610 (criticizing majority‘s new method of counting states).  
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traced not only to changing societal norms but also to changed 
methodology.  
Stare decisis, then, cannot wholly explain the Court‘s approaches in 
Baze and Kennedy. But even if it could, the Court would need to justify 
why it takes such different approaches when determining what is ―cruel 
and unusual.‖ In short, even if the Court treated the doctrinal lines more 
distinctly, it would need to provide some reason why it defers so readily to 
the state‘s policy and facts in one set of cases and not the other.  
C. Interfering with the Death Penalty 
Another potential explanation is that the Court interfered in the case 
less likely to obstruct the death penalty more generally. Kennedy indicated 
a ―necessity to constrain the use of the death penalty,‖175 but, in reality, 
child rape on its own is so rarely punished by death that the Court‘s 
decision will likely prevent very few executions in this country. The 
Court, in fact, noted that no one has been executed for rape in the United 
States since 1964.
176
 Kennedy‘s holding, then, does little to alter the actual 
number of executions. If anything, cases like Kennedy, Roper, and Atkins 
might even strengthen support for the death penalty by eliminating some 
of the death penalty‘s more objectionable applications.  
By contrast, the Court apparently feared that striking down Kentucky‘s 
execution procedure in Baze would have interfered far more significantly 
with the death penalty nationwide. Even though lethal injection actions, by 
definition, challenge not the death sentence but rather the manner in which 
that sentence will be executed,
177
 the Court seems to have worried that 
invalidating Kentucky‘s lethal injection procedure even on narrow 
grounds might have perpetuated a nationwide moratorium on executions, 
which began when the Court granted certiorari in Baze.
178
 The plurality 
even emphasized that capital punishment is constitutional and that, 
therefore, ―there must be a means of carrying it out.‖179 Baze thus 
 
 
 175. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008).  
 176. Id. at 2657. 
 177. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 580 (2006); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 
(2004).  
 178. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Stay Execution, A Signal to Lower Courts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 31, 2007, at A1. Justice Scalia at oral argument explained, ―I‘m very reluctant to send it back to 
the trial court so we can have a nationwide cessation of all executions [which] . . . could take years.‖ 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (No. 07-5349). 
 179. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1529 (2008) (plurality opinion) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (plurality opinion)).  
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emphasized that litigation must not ―frustrate the State‘s legitimate interest 
in carrying out a sentence of death in a timely manner.‖180 
The Court, of course, did not explicitly premise the level of deference 
on the practical implications of the case. And, of course, some justices 
would have deferred to the State in both cases, regardless of the 
implications.
181
 But the Court was more willing to step in when 
widespread interference with capital punishment was less likely.  
D. Litigation Costs 
The Court‘s approaches here also reflect the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts‘ concerns about constitutional litigation more generally.182 To 
provide a famous example, the Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal
183
 recently 
ratcheted up the well-known Conley pleading standard.
184
 Iqbal held that 
―a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
‗state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‘‖185 ―[B]are assertions 
. . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a ‗formulaic recitation of the 
elements‘ of a constitutional discrimination claim‖ would not do.186 Iqbal 
thus created a potential sea change in civil rights litigation.
187
 Some civil 
rights plaintiffs know they have been wronged by government officials, 
but because the relevant facts are uniquely in the possession of the 
government, they do not know precisely what policies or which officials 
caused the injury. Iqbal‘s requirements arguably invite lower courts to 
dismiss litigation before discovery that could uncover evidence 
corroborating the plaintiffs‘ claims. Such dismissals will likely doom 
some meritorious civil rights actions because many plaintiffs need 
 
 
 180. Id. at 1537. 
 181. See infra Part II.E.  
 182. See, e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an 
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1107 (2006) 
(arguing that the Rehnquist Court ―worked assiduously to limit the power of courts to adjudicate run-
of-the-mill civil disputes‖).  
 183. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 184. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (―[A] complaint should not be dismissed 
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.‖). 
 185. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2006)).  
 186. Id. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).  
 187. See id. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that Iqbal improperly ―require[s] . . . court[s] 
at the motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the factual allegations are probably true‖). Iqbal 
was surely significant, but one should also not overstate its importance. See, e.g., Randall v. Scott, No. 
09-12862, 2010 WL 2595585, at *8 (11th Cir. June 30, 2010) (―After Iqbal it is clear that there is no 
‗heightened pleading standard‘ as it relates to cases governed by Rule 8(a)(2), including civil rights 
complaints. All that remains is the Rule 9 heightened pleading standard.‖).  
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discovery to gain access to the facts to establish that their allegations are, 
indeed, rooted in fact.  
Baze seems to view civil rights litigation similarly—as a drain on 
judicial and governmental time and resources.
188
 Lethal injection 
challenges involve substantial discovery into the details of a state‘s 
execution procedure.
189
 Recognizing the threat of these costs nationwide, 
the plurality provided lower courts a roadmap to dismiss lethal injection 
claims,
190
 thus potentially cutting off discovery that could uncover dangers 
of the sort that arose in Missouri and California.
191
 Like Iqbal, then, Baze 
arguably allows lower courts to dismiss cases before the plaintiff has had 
an opportunity to gather evidence supporting his claims, thus rewarding 
government secrecy.  
By contrast, Kennedy‘s potential for clogging courts with future 
litigation is limited. Because Eighth Amendment proportionality doctrine 
treats capital and noncapital sentences so differently,
192
 the Court had little 
reason to fear that its decision in Kennedy would extend to noncapital 
sentences, which, of course, make up the vast bulk of sentences 
nationwide. The remedy in Kennedy, in other words, appeared to be a one-
time announcement, unlikely to require any future judicial administration.  
Of course, courts do shape doctrine according to the costs of 
litigation.
193
 But while such concerns may justify doctrinal differences on 
the margins, they do not justify fashioning a broad rule that may shut 
down all future efforts to understand execution procedures. Furthermore, 
even though litigation costs are real, the Court never argues that they are 
so great as to command entirely different approaches to the same 
constitutional provision in different contexts. Iqbal helps demonstrate that 
Baze‘s concerns about litigation costs are hardly anomalous, but if those 
costs are to be constitutionally decisive, the Court needs to explain why.  
 
 
 188. Of course, other recent decisions likely engender more new litigation. See, e.g., Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (inviting certain types of employment litigation); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (inviting future challenges to gun regulations).  
 189. Berger, supra note 7, at 277.  
 190. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1537 (2008) (holding that lethal injection procedures 
―substantially similar‖ to Kentucky‘s would pass constitutional muster); supra notes 51, 128–29 and 
accompanying text.  
 191. See supra note 86. 
 192. See generally Barkow, Two Tracks, supra note 62, at 1148–49 (arguing that the Court 
reviews capital and noncapital sentencing very differently).  
 193. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 182, at 1144 (discussing the Court‘s ―concerns about the cost of 
litigation‖).  
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E. Justices’ Personal Preferences 
While the Supreme Court treats itself as a single entity, the obvious 
fact remains that each case boils down to particular justices‘ votes. From 
this perspective, Baze and Kennedy are best reconciled perhaps not by 
some unifying constitutional theory but by the fact that certain justices 
were more offended by the death penalty for child rapists than by 
Kentucky‘s lethal injection procedure. Four justices—Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—voted in the state‘s favor 
in both cases.
194
 Two justices—Souter and Ginsburg—voted against the 
state in both cases.
195
 The three remaining justices—Stevens, Kennedy, 
and Breyer—voted in favor of the state in Baze (albeit in three separate 
opinions) and against it in Kennedy.
196
 Of these three, however, only 
Justice Kennedy joined the Chief Justice‘s Baze plurality opinion.197 By 
contrast, Justice Breyer explicitly agreed with the dissent‘s less deferential 
standard for lethal injection challenges.
198
 Justice Stevens did not 
articulate his own legal standard but also emphasized that he thought the 
state should be entitled to considerably less deference than the plurality 
afforded it.
199
 In this regard, though Justices Stevens and Breyer found no 
constitutional violation in Baze, they would both, consistent with their 
votes in Kennedy, apply less deference in reviewing the state‘s practice 
than the plurality opinion. 
This leaves us with Justice Kennedy. It has been often remarked that 
the key to close cases lies with Justice Kennedy, and this area is no 
different.
200
 Kennedy presented a typical 5–4 split, with the four more 
 
 
 194. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1525–38 (plurality opinion) (written by Chief Justice Roberts and 
joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito); id. at 1538–42 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1552–56 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (joined by Justice Thomas); id. at 1556–1563 (Thomas, J., concurring) (joined by Justice 
Scalia); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2665–78 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas). 
 195. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1567–72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Souter); 
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2645–65 (majority opinion) (written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer).  
 196. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1542–52 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1563–67 (Breyer, J., 
concurring); supra notes 194–95.  
 197. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1525 (plurality opinion).  
 198. See id. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing with dissent‘s standard); id. at 1568 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (considering degree of risk, magnitude of pain, and availability of 
alternatives on sliding scale).  
 199. Id. at 1545 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that state ―officials with no specialized medical 
knowledge and without the benefit of expert assistance or guidance‖ do not deserve ―the kind of 
deference afforded legislative decisions‖).  
 200. Remarkably, during the Court‘s October 2006 term, Justice Kennedy voted with the minority 
only twice and with the majority in every single 5–4 decision. Jason Harrow, Justice Kennedy’s 
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―liberal‖ justices voting to strike down the death penalty for child rape and 
the four more ―conservative‖ justices disagreeing. Justice Kennedy voted 
with the more ―liberal‖ justices.201 In Baze, seven justices voted to uphold 
Kentucky‘s lethal injection procedure, but, as we have seen, two of those 
(Stevens and Breyer) would have applied a less deferential standard. On 
the question of deference, then, we see a similar 5–4 split, but with Justice 
Kennedy this time joining the conservatives. From this perspective, Justice 
Kennedy‘s idiosyncratic views perhaps best explain the discrepancy 
between Baze and Kennedy.
202
  
Though this explanation certainly contains some truth, it also ignores 
the extent to which Kennedy and Baze reflect a larger doctrinal divide.
203
 
Proportionality cases have frequently struck down particular applications 
of the death penalty.
204
 Indeed, before reaching the child-rape issue, the 
Court had already ruled years ago—before Justice Kennedy joined the 
Court—that capital punishment could not be imposed for rape of an adult 
woman without death of the victim.
205
 Similarly, though Baze was the first 
lethal injection challenge to reach the Supreme Court, it was largely 
consistent with lower court decisions applying essentially heightened 
scrutiny to such challenges.
206
 To this extent, though Justice Kennedy‘s 
 
 
Remarkable OT06, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/06/justice-kennedys-remarkable-
ot06/ (June 28, 2007, 5:20 PM); see also Eric J. Segall, Reconceptualizing Judicial Activism as 
Judicial Responsibility: A Tale of Two Justice Kennedys, 41 ARIZ ST. L.J. 709, 739–53 (2009) 
(discussing Justice Kennedy‘s constitutional jurisprudence).  
 201. The labels ―liberal‖ and ―conservative‖ are obviously oversimplifications, but, that being 
said, several other recent high-profile cases have broken down along these same lines with Justice 
Kennedy casting the deciding vote. In some cases, he voted with the ―liberals.‖ See, e.g., Boumediene 
v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (habeas for Guantanamo detainees); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497 (2007) (environmental standing). In others, he voted with the ―conservatives.‖ See, e.g., Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (racial preferences in promotions); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937 (2009) (pleading standards); District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (guns); 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (race-based 
preferences in schools); Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (abortion).  
 202. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―Seldom has an 
opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members.‖); Lain, 
Deciding Death, supra note 87, at 5–6 (―The Justices decide death the way they want to, not the way 
they have to [so] doctrine does little, if anything, to keep the Justices from ruling however they are a 
priori inclined to rule.‖).  
 203. See supra Part II.B.  
 204. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–60 (2005) (invalidating death penalty for 
individuals who were under eighteen when they committed capital crimes); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (invalidating death penalty for mentally retarded individuals).  
 205. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (―We have concluded that a sentence of 
death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.‖). 
 206. See Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2008) (summarily rejecting Eighth 
Amendment claim); Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1082–85 (8th Cir. 2007) (ignoring evidence 
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views certainly do disproportionately shape constitutional doctrine, his 
votes here actually follow more substantial doctrinal rifts.  
F. Summary 
The foregoing may be plausible explanations for the varying levels of 
deference, but they are not adequate justifications. They are certainly not 
justifications the Court itself openly embraces to defend the discrepancy. 
One might be tempted to conclude that Baze and Kennedy are different 
cases about different issues, except they involve challenges to state death 
penalty practices under the same constitutional amendment and invoke 
similar language and tests. Those tests, however, offer no guidelines on 
the rigor of judicial review of either policy or facts. The Court need not 
approach each Eighth Amendment case the same way, but it ought to 
explain why different Eighth Amendment challenges trigger such different 
levels of review. Indeed, without such guidelines, the Court is more likely 
to be derailed by considerations discussed in this Part. The Court needs a 
theory of deference.  
III. DEFERENCE AND DEMOCRATIC PEDIGREE 
To arrive at a theory of deference, we initially must consider what 
drives judicial deference in the first place. Section A of this Part therefore 
discusses current justifications for deference in constitutional cases. With 
these justifications in mind, Section B proposes a new theory of deference 
based on a challenged policy‘s ―democratic pedigree.‖ Section C applies 
the proposed theory to Baze and Kennedy. Section D discusses the 
normative and practical advantages of this theory.  
A. Justifications for Judicial Deference 
Before articulating a theory of deference, we should start with what 
often drives judicial deference in constitutional cases. Judicial deference is 
―not a well-defined concept,‖207 but, generally speaking, it encourages 
courts to follow another governmental branch‘s decisions, which the court 
may not have reached itself.
208
 As noted above, courts generally defer on 
 
 
about procedure‘s dangers and reversing finding that Missouri procedure violated Constitution); 
Lightborne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 351 (Fla. 2007) (―[T]his Court‘s role is not to micromanage 
the executive branch in fulfilling its own duties relating to executions.‖).  
 207. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1983). 
 208. Schapiro, supra note 36, at 665.  
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the basis of either the political or epistemic authority of the deferred-to 
institution.
209
 With regards to ―political authority,‖ courts often cite 
separation-of-powers concerns militating against judicial overreaching into 
the political branches‘ policies.210 The Court recognizes that ours is a 
democratic government and that elected officials answerable to ―the 
people‖ should make controversial policy decisions, rather than unelected 
judges.
211
 As Justice Frankfurter famously and repeatedly argued, judges 
should not lightly override the policy determinations of officials who are 
elected by and accountable to the people.
212
 More recently in Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Court explained, 
―federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect 
legitimate policy choices made by those who do.‖213  
Courts also sometimes defer on factual issues when another actor 
possesses more expertise than judges.
214
 Courts therefore defer to 
institutions attributed with particular experience, often noting that 
judges—in comparison to other decisionmakers—lack the time, resources, 
and skills to make particular factual determinations about uncertain or 
ambiguous data.
215
 As Professor Solove puts it, deference on these 
grounds ―depends upon certain assumptions about the superior ability of 
government institutions, officials, and experts to make factual judgments 
within their areas of specialty.‖216  
Political and epistemic authority are sensible reasons for courts to defer 
to other institutions, but courts sometimes invoke them carelessly. Indeed, 
for all of the times that the Court invokes principles of deference, neither 
courts themselves nor scholars have paid much attention to whether 
judicial deference in practice follows the theoretical justifications for it.
217
 
As Kennedy and Baze illustrate, the Court defers when it wants to. But, if 
 
 
 209. See Horwitz, supra note 10, at 1068; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive 
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1278–79 (1996); supra note 37 and 
accompanying text.  
 210. Horwitz, supra note 10, at 1079.  
 211. See BICKEL, supra note 29, at 16–17 (discussing the countermajoritarian problem). 
 212. See, e.g., Am. Fed. of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 553 (1949) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring) (―Even where the social undesirability of a law may be convincingly urged, invalidation 
of the law by a court debilitates popular democratic government.‖).  
 213. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). 
 214. Horwitz, supra note 10, at 1086. 
 215. See Solove, supra note 11, at 1004–08 (summarizing some justifications for judicial 
deference).  
 216. Id. at 1011; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (arguing that ―[j]udges are not experts in this 
field‖ and therefore should defer).  
 217. See Solove, supra note 11, at 969 (―[T]heories of judicial review have failed to adequately 
confront deference.‖).  
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we are to take seriously the Court‘s stated rationales for deference, then 
the Court‘s deference determinations should be linked more directly to the 
challenged institution‘s political and epistemic authority, particularly in 
areas like the Eighth Amendment, where there is not already a doctrinal 
formula for deference.  
B. Proposing a New Theory: Deference and Democratic Pedigree 
There is a significant body of scholarship hashing out penological 
theories to try to bring both greater order and depth to the Court‘s current 
Eighth Amendment doctrine.
218
 Many of these are excellent, thought-
provoking pieces about penological theory. However, given the Court‘s 
own explicit avoidance of an overarching penological theory, they are 
unlikely to sway the Court.
219
  
As an alternative to these substantive approaches, this Part develops a 
process-based theory of deference based on what I call the policy‘s 
―democratic pedigree,‖ which encompasses both the political authority and 
epistemic authority underlying the policy. Collectively, these inquiries can 
help courts determine the extent to which the policy results from properly 
functioning democratic and administrative processes helping to ―ensure[] 
broad participation in the processes[,] . . . distributions,‖ and benefits of 
government.
220
 Under this theory, courts should only presumptively defer 
when the policy has a strong democratic pedigree.  
As we have seen, deference to other institutions‘ political authority is 
rooted in courts‘ conceptions that other institutions are more politically 
accountable than the judiciary and that policy decisions therefore should 
be made by these nonjudicial institutions.
221
 But governmental policies are 
 
 
 218. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 677, 681 (2005) (considering ―conceptual confusion over the meaning of proportionality‖); 
Julian Davis Mortenson, Earning the Right to Be Retributive: Execution Methods, Culpability Theory, 
and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1099, 1106 (2003) (arguing that 
under basic principles of culpability theory, botched executions violate the Eighth Amendment); 
Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit 
From Proportionality Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 86–87 (2009) (arguing that proportionality 
jurisprudence can shed light on prison condition cases).  
 219. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2659 (2008) (conceding that the Court‘s Eighth 
Amendment doctrine is ―still in search of a unifying principle‖); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 
(2003) (stating that the Constitution ―does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory‖ 
(quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Ristroph, supra note 158, at 1402 (arguing that the Supreme Court seems ―to reject the claim that 
penological theories have intrinsic moral relevance that would require the Eighth Amendment to be 
understood in terms of one or another specific punishment theory‖).  
 220. See ELY, supra note 20, at 87.  
 221. See BICKEL, supra note 29, at 16–17 (―[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a 
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not all equally democratic.
222
 Thus, to the extent that judicial deference is 
grounded in political authority, courts should consider whether the 
challenged policy, in fact, enjoys such democratic status, focusing 
especially on the nature of the administrative processes underlying the 
policy and whether the policy burdens unpopular minorities who cannot 
protect themselves through usual political channels.
223
  
To the extent that judicial deference also sometimes rests on the 
political branches‘ epistemic authority, courts should consider whether 
such expertise in fact exists in a given case. Though epistemic authority 
seems to implicate ―democracy‖ less than political authority, it is 
nevertheless relevant to democratic pedigree writ large, especially given 
that many constituents expect their representatives to delegate complex 
matters to agencies with the requisite expertise.
224
 Lawmakers delegating 
to agencies, then, have an implicit obligation to delegate to people who 
understand the area. When lawmakers don‘t, they undermine constituents‘ 
assumptions about the process and weaken the democratic pedigree of the 
resulting policy.  
These inquiries are not themselves determinative, but, collectively, 
they will reveal much about a challenged policy‘s democratic pedigree. 
Courts ultimately could apply heightened scrutiny for another substantive 
reason,
225
 but the inquiries presented here force them to consider whether 
their oft-stated reasons for deferring apply in a given case. This proposal, 
then, encourages courts to be straightforward about why they choose to 
apply a particular level of deference.  
Before proceeding, it is worth briefly addressing three potential 
objections to the theory proposed here. First, critics might contend that 
democratic pedigree is notoriously difficult to assess. Reasonable people 
can disagree, for instance, about whether the legislature or administrative 
agencies possess more political authority.
226
 Similarly, they can disagree 
 
 
legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual 
people . . . .‖). 
 222. See infra Parts III.B.1, III.C. 
 223. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 717 (2005) [hereinafter 
Barkow, Administering Crime] (arguing that scholars overlook how agencies responsible for criminal 
justice policies, such as sentencing commissions, parole boards, and corrections departments, ―perform 
as agencies‖).  
 224. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 400–01 (2002) 
(―[C]itizens often expect government officials to act based on superior, expert knowledge . . . . 
Sometimes this delegation is explicit . . . . More commonly, the delegation is implicit; citizens expect 
government agencies, legislative committees with expert staffs, and even judges to pay substantial 
attention to expert advice.‖).  
 225. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 226. See infra Part III.B.1.a. It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine whether policies 
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about what do to when political and epistemic authority clash, such as 
when politicians overrule agencies‘ expert determinations for political 
reasons.
227
 My goal is not to resolve these difficult debates in 
constitutional theory, but instead to identify important issues that have 
been overlooked in some constitutional contexts, including the Eighth 
Amendment. It is especially important that courts explore political and 
epistemic authority because they themselves identify them as reasons to 
defer in the first place.
228
 To this extent, my goal is less to develop an all-
encompassing constitutional theory, and more to push courts toward 
actually engaging in the analyses they purport to value.  
Second, critics might contend that multi-factored inquiries to determine 
levels of deference are subject to judicial manipulation. The conventional 
tiers of scrutiny are themselves arguably passing out of vogue for that 
reason.
229
 With this concern in mind, it is important to emphasize that my 
theory does not seek rigid adherence to preexisting tiers of scrutiny but 
rather greater acknowledgement of the fact that courts—whether they 
admit it or not—review governmental policies with rigorous or forgiving 
review (or something in between), and the amount of deference they select 
may well determine the outcome of many cases. It is true that courts will 
enjoy flexibility under the theory proposed here, but they do today 
anyway.
230
 There is significant value in encouraging courts to articulate a 
 
 
resulting from referenda, which presumably enjoy heightened political authority, deserve special 
treatment.  
 227. See, e.g., Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the 
FDA‘s decision to only make Plan B contraception available to women over seventeen emanated from 
White House pressure and lacked usual, good faith agency procedures and reasoned decision making); 
Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 32, at 108 (―[T]he Court is concerned at the moment to insulate 
expert agencies from political influence.‖). 
 228. See supra Parts I.A, III.A.  
 229. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575–78 (2003) (failing to articulate standard of 
review); Transcript of Oral Argument at 44–45, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) 
(No. 07-290) (Roberts, C.J., suggesting that the Court need not decide upon a level of scrutiny); Jack 
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Remembering How to Do Equality, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 93, 
103 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (discussing ―unworkable doctrinal structure‖ 
resulting from tiers of review). 
 230. The tiers of scrutiny employed in equal protection and other constitutional areas are often 
criticized because they can be easily manipulated or altogether ignored. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Six 
Conservatives in Search of the First Amendment: The Revealing Case of Nude Dancing, 33 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 611, 623 (1992) (recounting argument that ―multifactor tests that [can bear] the stamp 
of subjectivity and arbitrariness‖); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
1267, 1298–1300 (2007) (arguing that the development of intermediate scrutiny undermined the 
Court‘s self-discipline that the tiers of scrutiny were supposed to impose); R. Randall Kelso, Standards 
of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting 
Individual Rights: The ―Base Plus Six‖ Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 225, 237–46 (2002) (describing a ―proliferation‖ of standards of review from three to seven 
and analyzing the problems associated with expanding the available standards of review); Calvin 
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level of deference based on more careful consideration of the factors they 
typically cite when they defer, even if that articulation is only an 
approximation.  
A third, more normative, objection is that in the individual rights 
setting, courts should not focus on democratic pedigree because the very 
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to check majoritarian impulses.
231
 But I am 
only suggesting that democratic pedigree should be one important 
constitutional inquiry—not the only one. Drawing and quartering would 
be an unconstitutional method of execution even if democratically enacted 
by a transparent legislature because it would pose a ―substantial risk of 
serious harm‖ and could be easily replaced with a less painful 
alternative.
232
 Moreover, this objection does not address the Court‘s 
inconsistent approaches to deference. Bickel‘s concern that judicial review 
is countermajoritarian is often reflexively repeated without admission that 
not all judicial interference is equally antidemocratic.
233
 When courts 
strike down a well-publicized, legislatively enacted, carefully debated, 
generally applicable statute that burdens no particular minority 
disproportionately, its action (though sometimes justifiable) is 
countermajoritarian. When courts strike down an agency policy adopted in 
secret with no legislative guidance or oversight, the countermajoritarian 
concern sharply decreases. By assuming that judicial intervention is 
necessarily countermajoritarian, courts ignore context and misconstrue 
precisely why some judicial intervention is potentially problematic.
234
  
 
 
Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 980–91 (2004) 
(arguing that the current ―artificial‖ system of tiered scrutiny has been brought to near death by the 
decisions in Lawrence and Grutter).  
 231. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 27, at 1065–67 (arguing that the Constitution protects substantive 
values).  
 232. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (articulating Eighth Amendment test for 
method-of-execution claims); supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
 233. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (introducing deferential standard to prevent courts from 
intruding on the role of state legislatures); BICKEL, supra note 29, at 16–23 (discussing ―deviant‖ and 
―counter-majoritarian‖ nature of judicial review). 
 234. But see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 215–16 (2002) (arguing that Bickel and 
others overstated the countermajoritarian forces and that those concerns reflect a unique set of 
historical circumstances).  
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1. Political Authority 
a. The Legislative Conundrum  
To the extent that judicial deference is premised on political authority, 
the traditional view is that courts owe greater deference to legislatures than 
to administrative agencies. As Professor Ely famously explained, 
legislative action is presumptively more democratic than agency action 
and therefore should enjoy greater judicial deference.
235
 While delegation 
serves an important role in our system of government, legislators can also 
use it to avoid crafting policy and thereby cynically enhance their 
reelection chances. As Ely puts it, ―the common case of nonaccountability 
involves . . . a situation where the legislature (in large measure, precisely 
in order to escape accountability) has refused to draw the legally operative 
distinctions, leaving that chore to others who are not politically 
accountable.‖236 On this view, legislative enactments often better reflect 
the will of the democratic majority, having (usually) been enacted by 
majority vote of two separate legislative houses and by executive 
signature.
237
 Accordingly, because the hurdles for enacting legislation are 
high, policies reflected in statutes emerging from these rigorous strict 
processes deserve special respect.
238
  
An alternative scholarly view questions whether legislatively enacted 
statutes are actually more democratic than agency actions. Agencies, in 
fact, can be more deliberative, transparent, and accountable than Ely 
suggests.
239
 As the Court explained in Chevron,  
 
 
 235. ELY, supra note 20, at 130–31. 
 236. Id. See generally THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND 
THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 125–26 (1969) (arguing that a legislature‘s failure to legislate 
results in bad government).  
 237. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring bicameralism and presentment). 
 238. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND 
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 66–67 (4th ed. 2007) (describing ―vetogates‖ in the legislative 
process where a bill can get defeated); JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 2–6 (1999) 
(discussing the process of legislation as ―the representatives of the community com[ing] together to 
settle solemnly and explicitly on common schemes and measures that can stand in the name of them all 
. . . and . . . do[ing] so in a way that openly acknowledges and respects (rather than conceals) the 
inevitable differences of opinion and principle among them‖).  
 239. See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, 
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1954 (2008) (―Agency 
proceedings are more transparent than intuition might suggest.‖); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and 
Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781–90 (1999) (arguing that 
agencies can be better venues for accountability); Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the 
Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 946–57 
(2000) (discussing doctrines promoting agency accountability). 
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[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking 
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly 
rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to 
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to 
the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for 
this political branch of the Government to make such policy 
choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself 
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be 
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the 
statute in light of everyday realities.
240
 
Additionally, some recent scholarship contends that legislatures are 
less accountable than the traditional view acknowledges. Because voters 
are often poorly informed, the legislature is far less accountable than we 
might think.
241
 Elections, on this view, cannot deliver accountability as 
well as scholars like Bickel assume, in part because of the large gap 
between voters‘ real preferences and their representatives‘ votes.242 
Moreover, legislatures cannot feasibly be expected to prescribe in 
adequate detail the rules governing every facet of all regulated activity.
243
 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine whether legislatures 
or agencies, as a theoretical matter, possess more political authority.
244
 
 
 
 240. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984); see 
also Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 239, at 1980 (arguing that the ―political branches of government 
sufficiently constrain agencies that their decisions generally do not deviate greatly from the 
postdeliberation preferences of the polity‖); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of 
Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 505 
(2005) (arguing that agencies ―are the executors of the President‘s constitutional responsibility‖ to 
faithfully execute the laws).  
 241. Jane S. Schacter, Political Accountability, Proxy Accountability, and the Democratic 
Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 45, 47–48 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).  
 242. Id. at 48.  
 243. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (―The field of 
Congress involves all and many varieties of legislative action, and Congress has found it frequently 
necessary to use officers of the Executive Branch, within defined limits, to secure the exact effect 
intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting discretion in such officers to make public regulations 
interpreting a statute and directing the details of its execution . . . .‖).  
 244. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A 
DEMOCRACY 1 (1960) (arguing that government is ―too complex and delicate . . . for the rough 
template of schematization‖); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC 
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 152–56 (1997) [hereinafter MASHAW, GREED] (arguing that 
delegating political authority to administrative agencies is ―a device for improving the responsiveness 
of government to the desires of the general electorate‖); Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and 
Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 674 (1992) 
(arguing that the involvement of the judiciary and executive branches in agency decisions seriously 
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Courts do not resolve theoretical questions of political accountability but 
real cases with real facts. The relative ―democratic pedigree‖ of legislative 
or agency action, then, should turn not on the abstract virtues of legislative 
versus administrative action, but rather on the context of a particular case.  
Courts searching for a level of deference based on political authority do 
not have much to guide them in the legislative context. Whereas 
administrative law provides courts with a series of inquiries to assess the 
relative propriety of agency action,
245
 no such manageable judicial 
standards exist for assessing the inner workings of our legislatures.
246
 
Indeed, courts tend to resist measuring the political authority of legislative 
action, except in extreme circumstances. It is true, of course, that some 
statutory provisions emerge from open debate about policy issues and that 
other provisions are snuck into omnibus legislation by lobbyists, 
sometimes without the knowledge of many lawmakers voting on the 
bill.
247
 Clearly, legislation is problematic when it is consistently 
misrepresented in Congress, or when Congress never deliberated about its 
constitutionality or policy effects. But while openly debated legislation 
theoretically enjoys stronger political authority than stealth bills, the 
spectrum between these extremes is wide, and courts typically lack 
manageable standards to assess a provision‘s political authority. Of course, 
courts sometimes require a clear statement of congressional intent, thus 
prioritizing deliberative and consensual lawmaking.
248
 These 
presumptions, however, only apply in certain contexts, such as judicial 
interpretation of statutes arguably encroaching on state sovereignty.
249
 
More typically, when the Court reviews the constitutionality of legislation, 
 
 
undermines Congress's efforts to design procedural, substantive, and structural rules to control agency 
behavior).  
 245. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, §§ 701–706 (2006); infra Part III.B.1.b.  
 246. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (―Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings 
. . . .‖); Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A 
Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 509–11 (1997) (arguing that appropriation riders 
subvert the integrity of the legislative process but are typically not susceptible to judicial challenge). 
 247. See William A. Fletcher, Atomic Bomb Testing and the Warner Amendment: A Violation of 
the Separation of Powers, 65 WASH. L. REV. 285, 307, 309–20 (1990) (discussing legislative 
amendment that ―was consistently misrepresented as it made its way through the legislative process‖ 
and suggesting that this is a separation of powers problem); Richard Murphy, The Brand X 
Constitution, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1247, 1300 (2007) (arguing that much legislation ―does not receive 
serious, broad-based scrutiny‖ from legislators).  
 248. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (requiring clear statement rule 
for legislation applying to state policymaking appointees); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 
U.S. 234, 239–40 (1985) (requiring clear statement rule for legislation abrogating state sovereign 
immunity). 
 249. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 238, at 922–41 (discussing ―new federalism canons‖); 
supra note 248.  
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it gives scant attention to the nature of the democratic deliberation. Indeed, 
regular judicial inquiries into the quality of legislative deliberation would 
likely be messy and unpredictable.
250
  
Courts therefore typically assume that lawfully enacted statutes enjoy 
sufficient (if not ideal) political authority. The Constitution confers upon 
Congress lawmaking authority, and judicial deference sometimes rests on 
such express constitutional designation.
251
 As the Court explained in 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance Company, legislation drafted by Congress enjoys a 
―presumption of constitutionality‖—and, in that regard, is presumptively 
different from agency action.
252
 Of course, courts may determine whether 
statutes have been properly enacted under constitutionally prescribed 
procedures because the Constitution implicitly promises minimum due 
process for all legislation.
253
 However, no such constitutional mandates or 
manageable standards justify varying deference on the basis of whether a 
legislature has acted responsibly or even knowledgeably when enacting 
legislation.
254
 Accordingly, whether deserved or not, legislative action 
presumptively enjoys considerable political authority.
255
  
b. The Administrative Inquiry 
When legislatures have delegated lawmaking functions and the 
resulting policy is subject to constitutional challenge, courts determining 
the political authority underlying that policy ought to inquire into the 
details of the administrative action.
256
 Courts and scholars have been 
 
 
 250. See Murphy, supra note 247, at 1300–01 (―The last thing anyone should want is the Supreme 
Court checking whether a statute was scrutinized enough in committee or if enough members of 
Congress thought hard enough about it.‖).  
 251. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (―All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States . . . .‖); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401–02 (1819) (indicating 
that Court should defer to Congress‘s view of its own power); WALDRON, supra note 238, at 2–6.  
 252. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 n.9 (1983).  
 253. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 238, at 409–20 (discussing due process of lawmaking).  
 254. But see Murphy, supra note 247, at 1301–03 (arguing that the case for judicial deference to 
Congress turns partially on legislative deliberations used to adopt policy). 
 255. Of course, the Court does not always defer to Congress in constitutional cases. See, e.g., Bd. 
of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (refusing to defer to congressional 
findings regarding abrogation of state sovereign immunity); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
608–19 (2000) (refusing to defer to congressional findings linking violence against women to 
interstate commerce); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531–32 (1997) (striking down RFRA as 
neither congruent nor proportional). When the Court does not defer, however, it typically is not 
articulating a theory of deference but instead is policing some other substantive value, such as 
federalism.  
 256. Cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (empowering courts to look closely at processes behind 
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strangely inattentive to ordinary administrative law‘s relevance to the 
question of constitutional deference, especially in the individual rights 
context.
257
 It is true, of course, that administrative law principles often are 
enforced not through constitutional litigation, but pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or an agency‘s organic statute.258 But 
some agency action is exempted from administrative procedure acts or 
otherwise escapes administrative challenge.
259
 And yet, because the 
political authority of agency actions hinges on an array of factors, 
presumptive deference to administrative action in constitutional cases is 
inappropriate. While it is true that a decision to exempt a particular agency 
from the APA is itself a democratic determination worthy of some respect, 
the resulting policy cannot be said to have strong political authority, 
particularly if the public was largely uninformed about the relevant issues 
and the legislature washed its hands of the issue after delegation. In other 
words, legislative decisions to punt policy issues to agencies are not 
worthy of the same respect as legislative decisions taking ownership of a 
problem.
260
 Indeed, such legislative abdication and administrative 
haphazardness not only create political accountability problems but also 
heighten the danger of agency arbitrariness, which itself provides good 
reason for more searching judicial review.
261
 
 
 
making and rescinding rules).  
 257. One commentator has recognized that administrative law principles can help inform the level 
of deference appropriate in Eighth Amendment cases in the prison condition context. See Reinert, 
supra note 218, at 78 (―Teasing out the appropriate amount of deference would require a more 
expansive discussion of administrative law principles than there is room for here . . . .‖). Outside the 
Eighth Amendment context, see generally Gillian Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as 
Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 483 (2010) [hereinafter Metzger, Ordinary 
Administrative Law] (describing administrative principles as constitutional common law); Gillian E. 
Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2047–72 (2008) (discussing 
administrative law as a federalism vehicle); Murphy, supra note 247, at 1285–315 (explaining how 
administrative cases may shed light on constitutional issues). In a future Article, I will explore in 
greater detail the role that ordinary administrative law norms might play in constitutional individual 
rights cases.  
 258. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 527–28 (2003) [hereinafter Bressman, Beyond 
Accountability] (discussing ―ordinary‖ administrative law and noting that many important principles, 
like ―arbitrary and capricious‖ review, come from the APA). 
 259. For example, some states explicitly exempt correctional departments from administrative 
procedure requirements. See infra notes 302, 334.  
 260. See ELY, supra note 20, at 131 (―[T]he most effective way to get our representatives to be 
clearer about what they are up to in their legislation is to get them to legislate.‖).  
 261. See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 258, at 466 (arguing that ―the risk of 
arbitrary administrative decisionmaking‖ is a concern of ―paramount constitutional significance‖ that 
the standard focus on majoritarianism fails to acknowledge).  
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Predicating deference on how agencies behave is, in fact, consistent 
with current administrative law principles. In United States v. Mead,
262
 the 
Court made clear that judicial deference on the basis of agencies‘ political 
authority should not be applied blindly. The Court explained, ―[a]lthough 
we all accept the position that the Judiciary should defer to at least some 
of this multifarious administrative action, we have to decide how to take 
account of the great range of its variety.‖263 Agencies, then, should get 
deference when they act in ways deserving of deference.
264
  
I should emphasize a few points here. First, the fact that a policy is 
administrative should not in and of itself trigger much higher scrutiny than 
a legislative policy. As noted above, the decision to delegate a particular 
matter to an agency is usually a democratic decision. Indeed, given that 
our democracy has implicitly accepted that agencies make many important 
lawmaking decisions, it would be hard to contend that ―the people‖ at 
some level have not blessed agencies as decisonmakers.
265
 Rather, the 
degree of deference to an administrative policy should be predicated on 
whether the policy is consistent with ordinary administrative law 
principles. Second, each of the administrative inquiries should help guide 
a sliding scale of deference; none is itself determinative.
266
 Courts owe 
more deference to policies satisfying more of these administrative 
inquiries. Third, to be clear, these ―administrative law‖ tests should not be 
used to revive the nondelegation doctrine, under which courts can limit 
Congress‘s authority to delegate to administrative agencies.267 Instead, 
 
 
 262. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 263. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236; see also Nat‘l Cable & Telecomm. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (holding that agency interpretation of statute trumps prior judicial ruling, 
provided that court did not deem its interpretation the only permissible one); Smiley v. Citibank, 517 
U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (explaining Chevron presumption that statutory ambiguities would be 
resolved by agencies rather than courts); Murphy, supra note 247, at 1309 (discussing constitutional 
deference and Brand X). 
 264. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the extent to which agencies are subject to 
agency capture. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State Is Inconsistent 
with the Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 491, 492–93 (2008) (arguing that the risk of political 
capture by interest groups is an underappreciated vice of the administrative state).  
 265. See, e.g., MASHAW, GREED, supra note 244, at 10 (arguing that our government has 
increasingly been administered through agencies); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the 
Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2074 (2005) (arguing that strenuous criticism 
of the administrative state ―distracts our attention from the government we actually possess‖).  
 266. While it is true that multifactor tests lend themselves to judicial discretion and confusion, 
judicial deference currently exists on an unannounced sliding scale anyway. Even the familiar 
standards of review fall along a spectrum rather than rigid categories. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 673 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that many critics think 
―in reality there is a spectrum of standards of review‖).  
 267. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (summarizing 
nondelegation principles requiring that Congress delegate with an intelligible principle).  
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where legislatures have delegated significant authority to agencies, courts 
should not review deferentially without inquiring first into the nature of 
the delegation and the agency action.
268
 Finally, though these 
administrative inquiries generally indicate an agency policy‘s political 
authority, particular circumstances might militate in favor of deferring 
even where political authority is comparatively weak. In other words, the 
administrative factors discussed here, while important, need not be binding 
when there are other persuasive considerations, such as perhaps national 
security concerns.
269
 To this extent, the theory proposed here aims to 
identify inquiries courts should consider in constitutional cases.
270
 It does 
not seek to provide a strict code that courts should always apply.  
 i. Intelligible Principles  
As we have seen, judicial deference to the political branches often rests 
on the widespread understanding that in a constitutional democracy, policy 
decisions should be made by elected officials accountable to ―the people.‖ 
When legislatures delegate policies to administrative agencies, the 
resulting policies are less the handiwork of elected and accountable 
officials, especially if the legislature offers little guidance to the people 
who actually put the policy in place.
271
 The ―democratic pedigree‖ of the 
resulting policy, then, diminishes as the degree of legislative guidance to 
the agency lessens.
272
  
Consequently, courts should look at the specificity of the delegation. 
The more specific the delegation, the closer the tie is between the 
 
 
 268. Cf. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 
201, 201–02 (suggesting that Congress necessarily will give authority to ―lower-level agency officials‖ 
to fill statutory gaps, but arguing that courts should ―distinguish among exercises of this authority‖).  
 269. See, e.g., infra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 270. For ease of presentation, I do not distinguish here between federal court review of federal and 
state agency actions. In certain contexts, federalism concerns might be a reason for federal courts to 
approach these issues differently in cases involving state agencies, but the principles discussed in this 
section generally apply similarly in both contexts.  
 271. Courts already recognize these principles in other contexts. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Principles, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 139, 148–50 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Nondelegation Principles] (identifying ―nondelegation canons‖ that are ―not recognized as 
such, but [are] central to the operation of modern public law and designed to ensure clear legislative 
authorization for certain decisions‖); cf. PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE‘S 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 68 (9th ed. 1995) (noting political accountability 
strand of nondelegation doctrine); infra Part III.D.2.  
 272. Cf. John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 223, 223–24 (2000) (arguing that by construing statutes to avoid nondelegation problems, the 
Court encourages ―legislative responsibility for society‘s basic policy choices‖).  
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bureaucrat‘s exercise of discretion and ―the people themselves.‖273 Broad 
delegation requires very little work or thought from elected officials, who 
can simply tell an agency, ―go take care of this.‖274 Indeed, legislatures 
sometimes vaguely delegate matters to unaccountable lower-level officials 
precisely because they seek to escape ―the sort of accountability that is 
crucial to the intelligible functioning of a democratic republic.‖275 
Accordingly, delegations lacking intelligible principles are often less 
deserving of judicial deference because the resulting policies lack the 
political authority that typically underlies the rationale for the deference in 
the first place. More specific delegation, by contrast, at least gives the 
agency some policy guidance from the legislature and, through it, ―the 
people.‖  
 ii. Rules Carrying the Force of Law 
Relatedly, courts should consider whether the legislature intended to 
delegate to the agency the authority to issue regulations with the force of 
law. In the administrative law context, courts ask if the legislature intends 
agency rules to have legal force. The Supreme Court famously held in 
Chevron that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes that the agency administers.
276
 Mead clarified that 
Chevron deference is predicated on a delegation of interpretive powers to 
agencies.
277
 With this predicate in mind, Mead distinguished between 
delegations that authorize regulation with ―legal norms‖ and those that do 
not.
278
 In Mead itself, the Court found a meaningful distinction between 
Customs decisions classifying goods in the first instance and legislative-
type agency activity that would bind more than the parties to a ruling even 
after classified goods had been admitted into the country.
279
 The lines 
between these categories can be fuzzy, but Mead makes clear that there is 
 
 
 273. See BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 15.  
 274. See ELY, supra note 20, at 133 (noting that ―policy direction‖ is what should be required of 
legislatures); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER 
DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 21–22 (1962) (―[E]ven if a statute telling an agency ‗Here is the problem: 
deal with it‘ be deemed to comply with the letter of [the Constitution], it hardly does with the spirit.‖). 
 275. ELY, supra note 20, at 132.  
 276. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
 277. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–32 (2001) (refusing to give agency 
Chevron deference because ―the terms of the congressional delegation give no indication that Congress 
meant to delegate authority to Customs to issue classification rulings with the force of law‖). 
 278. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 232 (citing United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 391 
(1999)).  
 279. Id. 
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a difference between mere agency action and agency lawmaking.
280
 
Agencies deserve more deference when the delegating legislature intends 
to give them the authority to make law.
281
  
 iii. Formalized Procedures  
Along similar lines, courts should consider the rigor of the 
administrative procedures used to adopt the challenged policy. Oftentimes, 
agencies adopt new policies through relatively formalized notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures.
282
 As Mead observed, policies resulting 
from such formalized procedures simultaneously tend ―to foster the 
fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement‖ with force 
of law.
283
 Such procedures, which usually also include reasoned 
explanation requirements, therefore help ―reinforce rule-of-law values.‖284  
Formalized procedures can also help courts consider whether the 
relevant agency itself ever considered the constitutional implications of its 
actions. As Professor Metzger argues, ―[f]ew [would] deny that agencies 
. . . have a legally enforceable duty to avoid violating the Constitution.‖285 
But agencies, perhaps particularly in the prison context, are sometimes so 
consumed with their own institutional concerns that they do not 
necessarily weigh constitutional issues properly.
286
 Agencies enacting 
 
 
 280. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore whether Mead was in fact correct, but, given 
Mead, its principles should not be wholly ignored in other contexts. See generally Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 563–65 (2009) [hereinafter Bressman, Chevron’s 
Mistake] (arguing that Mead does not go far enough to guide courts in determining agencies‘ 
interpretive authority when answering questions about statutory meaning, and thus courts ―are unlikely 
to grant agencies their delegated interpretive authority as often as Congress intends‖). 
 281. See id. at 554–55 (arguing that instead of focusing on statutory language, courts should 
determine deference to agencies by looking to a variety of factors to determine ―legislative intent to 
delegate interpretive issues to agencies‖); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 
(2000) (―Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy 
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not 
warrant Chevron-style deference.‖).  
 282. Even ―informal rulemaking‖ entails relatively formalized procedures. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b) (2006) (requiring notice and comment for informal rulemaking).  
 283. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31.  
 284. Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 280, at 604; see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard 
E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of 
Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 425–440 (discussing the requirement 
that agencies provide adequate reasons for their decisions). But see E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing 
Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992) (likening notice-and-comment rulemaking to Kabuki 
theater in that each is ―a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of 
something which in real life takes place in other venues‖).  
 285. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 257, at 524.  
 286. See Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census 
of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 506–07 (1997) (arguing that ―bureaucrac[ies‘] 
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policies through formalized procedures are more likely to consider 
constitutional values, in part because the notice-and-comment period gives 
the agency an opportunity to reflect on external concerns that might not 
have occurred to the agency itself and, in part, because agencies know that 
formalized procedures are more easily scrutinized.
287
 Thus, under the logic 
of Mead, policies resulting from formalized procedures deserve more 
deference than policies haphazardly thrown together.  
 iv. Oversight  
Courts should also consider whether anyone oversees the agents to 
whom the policy has been delegated. By oversight, I refer broadly to 
legislative, executive, and intra-agency oversight. Typically, legislatures 
delegate particular tasks to agency heads, who, in turn, delegate it to 
subordinates. (In the case of lethal injection, the delegation generally flows 
from the legislature to DOC directors, and then to independent contractors 
and prison employees.
288
) This subdelegation itself is arguably problematic 
in any event,
289
 but whatever problems intra-agency delegation may create 
are greatly heightened without adequate oversight.  
While oversight exists on a spectrum, there is a clear difference 
between the political branches checking to see how an agency has 
implemented a policy, on the one hand, and forever turning its head, on 
the other. The former approach attempts, however imperfectly, to 
supervise what the agency is doing, and recognizes that monitoring at least 
increases the probability that the agents will implement a constitutional 
policy resembling what the elected officials envisioned. The latter 
approach, by contrast, abandons all pretenses of accountability or 
responsibility. Even though there are admittedly many shades of gray in 
between, a court can roughly determine whether agency leaders review the 
 
 
mission[s] tend[] to dwarf competing values‖ so that bureaucrats are unlikely to discuss constitutional 
issues thoroughly); Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention 
in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 816–20 (1990) (arguing that the prison guards prioritize the pursuit 
of order at the expense of all other institutional goals, including constitutional norms). 
 287. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 257, at 497 (encouraging agencies to 
take constitutional values into account in their decision making).  
 288. See generally Berger, supra note 7, at 266–72 (discussing several states‘ lethal injection 
procedures). 
 289. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 268, at 237 (arguing that actions taken by the statutory 
delegatee deserve Chevron deference, but actions taken by subordinate officials to whom 
responsibilities were subdelegated do not deserve such deference).  
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actions below them, and whether either the legislature or executive 
generally is responsive to problems that might arise.
290
  
Legislative oversight of agencies can also help legislatures understand 
and correct problems and untenable policies resulting from delegation.
291
 
Similarly, intra-agency oversight can help ensure that low-level 
bureaucrats entrusted with problems beyond or outside their competence 
will get some guidance or assistance before doing anything too damaging. 
Oversight is, thus, an important way of making delegation work. Indeed, 
even scholars who argue that agencies are generally more accountable than 
legislatures concede that this is only true when legislatures hold agencies 
accountable.
292
 An agency‘s political authority, then, depends partially on 
the degree of oversight over the challenged policy.  
 v. Transparency 
Finally, courts assessing an agency policy‘s political authority should 
look to whether the policy is transparent. If most people do not know what 
their government is doing, there can hardly be said to be democratic 
support for the policies that the government enacts.
293
 As Ely puts it, 
―popular choice will mean relatively little if we don‘t know what our 
representatives are up to.‖294 If an agency acts openly, then even if the 
legislature has delegated the matter to an unelected body, the people 
themselves can at least theoretically keep an eye on the agency‘s actions 
and hold the legislature or executive accountable if they do not like what 
they see.
295
  
Legal structures currently do exist to keep agency policymaking in the 
public view. Before adopting a rule, federal agencies must announce their 
 
 
 290. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2007) (arguing that courts use administrative law to ensure that agency 
action roughly tracks ―legislative preferences‖).  
 291. See id. at 1777 (arguing that administrative law ―ensures that Congress has the information 
that it needs to perform fire-alarm oversight‖).  
 292. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 239, at 1939–40 (―[P]olitical oversight creates strong 
incentives for agencies to avoid actions that are at odds with popular sentiment.‖). 
 293. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Principles of Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE 
ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 15, 22 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana 
eds., 2006) (―[P]ublicity is important for the whole community, [because] it indicates what is being 
done in [the public‘s] name and gives them information [about] the appropriate deployment of [] 
political energies.‖).  
 294. ELY, supra note 20, at 125.  
 295. Admittedly, it may not always be easy for the public to know whether it should blame poor 
policy on the legislature delegating the policy or the executive appointing the agency head, but 
improved transparency should help the public make that determination, as well.  
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intent to do so in the Federal Register.
296
 An equivalent requirement 
applies in many states.
297
 Notice-and-comment rulemaking, for all its 
imperfections, gives the public a chance to evaluate proposed policies and 
observe the agency‘s decision-making process.298 And both state and 
federal agencies usually are subject to Freedom of Information Act 
requests requiring the disclosure of requested information, unless an 
exception applies.
299
  
These safeguards tell us that our government is generally sensitive to 
the issue of transparency and has tried to put in place structures to promote 
sunshine. Ideally, agencies will meet this objective most of the time. When 
they do, agency action is not particularly opaque.
300
 But there are 
exceptions. In particular, not all state administrative laws provide for as 
much transparency as the federal APA.
301
 Additionally, some agency 
actions, often including those associated with prisons, are explicitly 
exempted from state APAs, thus casting a veil of secrecy over whole areas 
of state action.
302
  
To the extent that agency transparency can differ significantly, 
deference to agency policies in constitutional cases should hinge, in part, 
on the openness of the relevant agency. Of course, transparency (like 
 
 
 296. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006) (―General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in 
the Federal Register.‖).  
 297. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.201 (2007) (providing for publication of ―state agency 
rules, determinations, and other matters‖ in Michigan register); CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 11344.1 (West 
2007) (requiring the Office of Administrative Law to publish the California Regulatory Notice 
Register). 
 298. CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND 
MAKE POLICY 54 (1994) (describing ―information, participation, and accountability‖ as key elements 
of rulemaking); Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a Standing 
Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391, 415 (2009) (―[T]he APA‘s notice-and-comment requirements . . . work to 
democratize agencies by increasing public involvement in the rulemaking process . . . .‖).  
 299. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (providing for agencies to make information public); MODEL 
STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT §§ 2-104(1) (1981) (―In addition to other rule-making requirements 
imposed by law, each agency shall . . . adopt as a rule a description of the organization of the agency 
which states the general course and method of its operations and where and how the public may obtain 
information or make submissions or requests‖). 
 300. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 239, at 1954–61 (arguing that agency proceedings are 
more transparent than many assume).  
 301. See, e.g., Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 297, 303–34 (1986) (recounting ―many differences‖ between federal and state administrative 
laws); Teresa Dale Pupillo, Note, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the Sunshine in the 
1990s—An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165, 1175–84 (1993) (arguing that 
many state sunshine laws do not effectively serve their purpose of promoting open government). 
 302. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 536.010(6)(k) (West 2009) (exempting ―statement concerning 
only inmates of an institution under the control of the department of corrections‖ from the APA‘s 
definition of a ―rule‖); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(10)(G) (2009) (exempting from APA 
―[s]tatements concerning inmates of a correctional facility‖). 
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oversight) exists on a spectrum, from complete openness to complete 
secrecy, and courts should therefore adjust the degree of deference they 
provide agencies based on where the challenged policy falls on that 
spectrum. Secrecy may also be desirable (and therefore more justifiable) in 
certain contexts, such as national security.
303
 Similarly, when legislatures 
delegate to agencies with instructions to design policies in secret, the 
resulting policy has greater democratic pedigree than when the agency 
operates in secret on its own accord. But given that accountability usually 
requires transparency, the political authority of even these delegations 
would be compromised and entitled to decreased judicial deference absent 
compelling reasons for the secrecy.
304
  
c. Protecting Unpopular Minorities  
Policies uniquely burdening an unpopular minority can also undermine 
such policies‘ political authority. As the famous Carolene Products 
footnote four argued, ―prejudice against discrete and insular minorities 
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching 
judicial inquiry.‖305 Like the administrative inquiries discussed above, this 
inquiry might also be considered a component of political authority. As 
Professor Ely puts it, policies that burden only select portions of the 
population and not ―people like us‖ are inherently suspect because they 
can deny classes of people access to political procedures that help ensure 
broad participation in government.
306
 This denial can happen in either of 
two ways. First, the people in power can choke the channels of political 
change to ensure that they will remain in power and keep the ―outs‖ out of 
power.
307
 Second, even if no one is literally denied the vote, sometimes 
representatives beholden to the majority can systematically disadvantage 
some minority, thereby denying that minority the protections of the laws 
 
 
 303. Of course, even in the national security context, complete secrecy is problematic (particularly 
when its purpose is to conceal government wrongdoing), but the balances should be struck differently 
than with more typical domestic regulatory schemes.  
 304. See Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the 
Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 924–25 (1999) (discussing connection between 
transparency and accountability); Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
737, 755 (2004) (arguing that ―accountability requires transparency‖).  
 305. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).  
 306. ELY, supra note 20, at 173. 
 307. Id. at 103.  
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enjoyed by other groups and people.
308
 In either instance, judicial 
intervention is warranted to assure the proper functioning of the political 
process so that constitutional law protects ―groups that find it hard or 
impossible to protect themselves through the political process.‖309  
It is, of course, very difficult to define whom we should be protecting. 
Carolene Products referred to ―discrete and insular‖ minorities, but, as 
Professor Ackerman points out, ―many other groups . . . fail to achieve 
influence remotely proportionate to their numbers [such as] . . . discrete 
and diffuse [groups] (like women), or anonymous and somewhat insular 
[groups] (like homosexuals), or both diffuse and anonymous [groups] (like 
the victims of poverty).‖310 The key issue, then, may not so much be a 
particular minority‘s ―discreteness‖ or ―insularity,‖ but rather its ability to 
protect itself through the usual political channels, particularly against both 
overt and covert hostility.
311
 There will, of course, always be winners and 
losers in the political system, but when the system systematically 
disadvantages certain minorities—particularly those especially vulnerable 
to treatment that ―people like us‖ would neither want nor expect for 
ourselves—the political authority of the resulting policy is lessened.312 
Courts, of course, do not treat policies burdening unpopular groups as 
necessarily unconstitutional, but such policies should be subject to less 
presumptive deference.  
2. Epistemic Authority 
In addition to political authority, courts also defer due to other 
institutions‘ superior epistemic authority.313 The assumption courts usually 
make is that nonjudicial political institutions will almost necessarily 
possess superior information, skills, and experience to evaluate relevant 
 
 
 308. Id.  
 309. William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 1, 20 (1996) [hereinafter Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line].  
 310. Ackerman, supra note 27, at 742 (emphasis omitted).  
 311. Id. It is beyond the scope of this Article to define precisely which unpopular groups should 
be covered or what methodologies should be employed to make such determinations. See, e.g., 
Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1052 (―[T]he definition of ‗we‘ and ‗they‘ is very likely to be arbitrary.‖). 
Nevertheless, courts should at least give more careful consideration to these questions, especially in 
the Eighth Amendment context. See infra notes 340–54 and accompanying text.  
 312. This analysis applies beyond those groups identified as ―suspect classes‖ under Fourteenth 
Amendment doctrine, though suspect classes, such as race, enjoy heightened protection in equal 
protection cases. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (subjecting racial classifications to ―the 
most rigid scrutiny‖ (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1994) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))). 
 313. See supra Parts I.A,  III.A.  
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factual evidence and assess the given problem.
314
 In Baze, for instance, the 
Court emphasized that ―some measure of deference to a State‘s choice of 
execution procedures‖ was appropriate because the alternative ―would 
involve courts in debatable matters far exceeding their expertise.‖315 
In many instances, courts are correct that agencies and other 
government actors possess important information and skills to make policy 
decisions.
316
 This assumption, however, is not always well-founded. When 
the relevant political actors lack expertise, the delegation becomes less 
deserving of deference because the relevant agents are no better than 
courts at evaluating the key facts. Indeed, to the extent that such agencies 
may create policy without even looking at the relevant facts, they would 
be even less competent than judges, who at least hear and consider 
evidence. Additionally, delegation without expertise lacks the implicit 
democratic support that other delegations enjoy. In an era of a pervasive 
administrative state, ―the people‖ typically expect that when the legislature 
delegates, it will be to experts.
317
  
As with political authority, judicial scrutiny of epistemic authority will 
usually be more searching for agencies than legislatures. The Court 
sometimes considers the legislature‘s epistemic authority but does not 
seem to take the inquiry too seriously. For instance, the Court sometimes 
strongly encourages Congress to include fact finding with statutes, such as 
those passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
318
 But when Congress then supplies such fact 
finding, the Court sometimes ignores what it itself has encouraged and 
strikes down the statute in question anyway, suggesting that Congress‘s 
epistemic authority is not terribly persuasive after all.
319
 The Court‘s 
erratic approach to these problems suggests that it sees legislative 
expertise and fact finding (or the lack thereof) as rhetorically useful but, 
 
 
 314. Solove, supra note 11, at 1003–06.  
 315. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 n.2 (2008).  
 316. For example, courts assume, usually correctly, that prison officials will understand security 
issues better than courts. See supra note 168 (citing cases). This expertise, of course, does not mean 
that everything prison officials do is constitutional, but it does mean that deference based on epistemic 
authority is more deserving than when officials lack such expertise.  
 317. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 224, at 400–01.  
 318. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (faulting Congress for ―lack of 
evidence‖ of age discrimination); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562–63 (1995) (faulting 
Congress for failing to include findings of facts linking guns in school zones to interstate commerce). 
 319. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368–73 (2001) (rejecting 
relevance of congressional findings of fact after having faulted Congress for not providing them in 
Kimel); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (―[T]he existence of congressional 
findings is not sufficient . . . to sustain . . . legislation.‖). 
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ultimately, of marginal importance to the business of actually deciding 
cases.
320
  
By contrast, agencies derive much legitimacy from their supposed 
expertise, so courts can and do examine whether a particular agency‘s 
expertise is real or illusory.
321
 As the Court explained in Hampton v. Mow 
Sun Wong,
322
 an administrative agency ―has an obligation to perform its 
responsibilities with some degree of expertise.‖323 Even beyond 
administrative law, courts have substantial experience assessing levels of 
expertise. For instance, courts often must make credibility determinations 
regarding potential expert witnesses, serving as a ―gatekeeper‖ to ensure 
that the claimed basis for technical testimony is valid.
324
  
Indeed, verification of expertise is essential to the proper workings of 
the administrative state.
325
 Delegation may be theoretically undemocratic, 
but it can relieve an overburdened legislature of some of its workload and 
place difficult, technical problems in the hands of people uniquely 
qualified to find workable remedies. From this perspective, delegation 
may be democratically justifiable, because in a modern, complex world, 
the general public expects that complicated problems will be handled by 
experts suited to understanding those problems.
326
 Similarly, the public 
 
 
 320. But see Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 747, 821 (1991) (quoting Justice Stone indicating a justice ought ―not apply [the] ordinary 
presumption [of deferring to the legislature] in [a] field where [he] knows the leg[islature] knows 
nothing‖ (citing conference notes of Justice Douglas) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 321. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) 
(suggesting that an administrative agency‘s interpretation of language in a complex and technical 
regulatory scheme is entitled to some deference because of administrators‘ expertise); Reuel E. 
Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative 
Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 419–21 (2007) (explaining the central role of agency expertise in 
defining the deferential judicial role in administrative law). 
 322. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
 323. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 115. 
 324. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding that the 
trial judge‘s role as a ―gatekeep[er]‖ of expert testimony is to ensure that the claimed basis for 
scientific testimony is valid).  
 325. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 62 (1993) (explaining that expertise is a virtue of bureaucracy and that agencies, 
therefore, typically should ―understand th[e] subject matter at least well enough to communicate with 
substantive experts, to identify the better experts, and to determine which insights of the underlying 
discipline can be transformed into workable administrative practices‖); David A. Brennen, The Power 
of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public Policy, and ―Charity‖ in Contemporary Society, 33 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 413–26 (2000) (describing a history of courts invalidating agency actions for 
lack of expertise); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency 
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 739–42 (2002) (discussing 
Supreme Court cases invoking ―enhanced agency expertise as the rationale for affording agency work 
product deference on judicial review‖). 
 326. See, e.g., A.C.L. Davies, Judicial Self-Restraint in Labour Law, 38 INDUS. L.J. 278, 304 
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expects that expert agencies will make their decisions ―based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors.‖327 In other words, agencies should 
actually make use of their putative expertise, rather than making 
haphazard, unstudied decisions. When agencies lack expertise or fail to 
make use of the expertise they have, the presumptive deference they 
receive should diminish significantly.
328
  
Collectively, these inquiries should help courts gauge the political and 
epistemic authority of a challenged policy. No inquiry is itself 
determinative, but, together, they reveal much about a policy‘s democratic 
pedigree. Accordingly, courts should consider these factors when deciding 
upon a level of deference in constitutional cases, at least where no existing 
doctrine already provides such guidance.  
C. Applications  
1. Baze 
The Baze Court failed to adequately consider the factors examined 
above. Indeed, the Baze plurality was startlingly oblivious to lethal 
injection‘s weak democratic pedigree. With regards to political authority, 
the legislature played little role in designing the challenged procedure. The 
relevant Kentucky statute, like many other lethal injection statutes, lacked 
any specificity. For example, it did not specify the drugs, merely stating 
that ―every death sentence shall be executed by continuous intravenous 
injection of a substance or combination of substances sufficient to cause 
death.‖329 Nor did the statute provide for any details about drug 
administration.
330
 Of course, it would be unrealistic and impractical for a 
statute to specify each step of a complicated procedure like lethal 
injection. Nor would a more specific statute guarantee humane executions. 
But statutes could specify some important guidelines to help improve 
 
 
(2009) (noting the ―assumption that officials are using their expertise to identify a ‗public interest‘ 
solution to a problem‖). 
 327. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
 328. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (―The fair measure of deference 
to an agency . . . has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to . . . [inter 
alia] relative expertness . . . .‖) (footnotes omitted).  
 329. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220(1)(a) (West 2006); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
704 (2009) (―The penalty of death shall be inflicted by an intravenous injection of a substance or 
substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death, under the supervision of the state department 
of corrections.‖); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(f) (2008) (proscribing similar guidelines); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 17-10-38 (2008) (same); Berger, supra note 7, at 303 (discussing vague statutes).  
 330. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220(1)(a) (West 2006). 
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safety, such as the general qualifications and training of execution team 
members, and the need for recordkeeping and contingency plans. Such a 
statute would still leave many important details to the DOC, but 
Kentucky‘s statute did not specify how to approach any of these issues.331 
This lack of legislative input casts serious doubt on the plurality‘s 
insistence that rigorous judicial inquiry ―would substantially intrude on the 
role of state legislatures in implementing their execution procedures.‖332 
Similarly, though the legislature likely did intend for the lethal 
injection protocol to carry the force of law, Kentucky did not adopt that 
protocol using formal administrative procedures. The Supreme Court in 
Baze, though, never asked what administrative procedures Kentucky 
followed, even though problems in other states arose in large part because 
prison officials designed execution protocols without following 
administrative law norms.
333
 A decision to promulgate a policy outside 
normal administrative procedures deprives the general population of notice 
of the agency‘s action and the agency itself of the benefit of outside 
input.
334
 That decision also makes it more likely that the officials in charge 
of the procedure will throw something together haphazardly and without 
serious reflection on the constitutional issues.
335
  
Relatedly, Kentucky, like other states, did little to oversee its execution 
procedure. The Baze trial court found that ―[t]hose persons who developed 
Kentucky‘s lethal injection protocol were apparently given the task 
without the benefit of scientific aid or policy oversight.‖336 Despite the 
trial court‘s criticism, this issue virtually disappeared from the case, even 
 
 
 331. See Baze v. Rees, No. 04-CI-01094, 2005 WL 5797977, at *6 (Cir. Ct. Ky. July 8, 2005) 
(―[P]ersons assigned the initial task of drafting the Commonwealth of Kentucky‘s first lethal injection 
protocol were provided with little to no guidance on drafting a lethal injection protocol . . . .‖).  
 332. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (plurality opinion).  
 333. See, e.g., Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1545 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that in most states, 
lethal injection was developed without the benefit of medical knowledge or expert guidance); Eric 
Berger, Thoughts on LB 36: Problems with the Proposed Bill to Institute Lethal Injection in Nebraska, 
1 NEB. L. REV. BULL. 14, 16–17 (2009), http://lawreview.unl.edu/?p=405 (arguing that both state and 
federal administrative law requirements generally provide opportunity for meaningful deliberation that 
lethal injection procedures sorely need). 
 334. Some states explicitly exempt execution protocols from state APAs. See, e.g., Jackson v. 
Danberg, No. 07M-09-141, 2008 WL 1850585 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that 
Delaware‘s lethal injection protocol is not subject to state APA); Middleton v. Mo. Dep‘t of Corr., 278 
S.W.3d 193 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (same for Missouri); Abdur‘Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 
311 (Tenn. 2005) (same for Tennessee); supra note 302. 
 335. See Berger, supra note 7, at 268–73, 301–14 (discussing problems resulting from states‘ lack 
of attention to lethal injection); Denno, Quandary, supra note 44, at 66–76 (explaining that the state 
adopted lethal injection procedures by just copying original Oklahoma protocol).  
 336. Baze v. Rees, No. 04-1094, 2005 WL 5797977, at *12 (Cir. Ct. Ky. July 8, 2005). 
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though problems in other states seemed to result from the legislature‘s 
abdication of responsibility.
337
  
As for transparency, Kentucky, like most death penalty states at the 
time of Baze, kept its execution protocols secret.
338
 For instance, it 
shielded its execution team from depositions, even though it could have 
made those team members available without disclosing their identities.
339
 
While most of the general public is unlikely to engage with lethal 
injection, states concealing their procedures are more likely to cut corners 
and make mistakes than if their procedures are in plain view. Collectively, 
then, the administrative inquiries cut sharply against the procedure‘s 
political authority and the Court‘s deferential approach in Baze.  
The ―unpopular minority‖ component of political authority is more 
complicated. Death row inmates—and, indeed, people charged with 
capital crimes—are usually unable to protect themselves through the 
political process.
340
 Indeed, death row inmates, like many convicted 
felons, are often literally disenfranchised.
341
 Capital defendants are, as 
Professor Lain puts it, ―about as unpopular a minority as one can find (for 
obvious and perfectly legitimate reasons).‖342 They also are 
disproportionately poor, black, and inadequately represented—that is, at a 
disproportionate risk of systematic disadvantage, even before they have 
been charged with a crime.
343
 Additionally, disenfranchisement laws for 
 
 
 337. See Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7–8 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) 
(finding that ―there are no checks and balances or oversight, either before, during or after the lethal 
injection occurs‖ and that resulting flaws in the procedure ―subject[] condemned inmates to an 
unacceptable risk of suffering unconstitutional pain and suffering‖); Berger, supra note 7, at 301–08 
(discussing problems with lack of oversight in Missouri, California, and Tennessee procedures). 
 338. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1571 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Berger, supra note 7, at 277, 307 
(discussing secrecy in lethal injection); Denno, Quandary, supra note 44, at 95 (explaining that 
―[s]tates never have been forthcoming about how they perform lethal injections‖ and that some states 
recently have ―retreated into greater secrecy‖); Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate 
Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It 
Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 117–18 (2002) (discussing missing information in lethal injection 
protocols).  
 339. In Missouri, for instance, the trial court fashioned an anonymous deposition in which the 
execution team leader sat behind a curtain during his deposition. See Doe Deposition, supra note 111, 
at 2 (noting anonymous deposition).  
 340. See ELY, supra note 20, at 103; supra Part III.B.1.c.  
 341. See The Sentencing Project Publishes Report on Disenfranchisement Reform, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/detail/news.cfm?news_id= 
492 (estimating that five million convicted felons were disenfranchised in 2008 election, including 
many who had completed their sentences). 
 342. Lain, Deciding Death, supra note 87, at 4. 
 343. Id. at 4–5; see also Stephen B. Bright, Will the Death Penalty Remain Alive in the Twenty-
First Century: International Norms, Discrimination, Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Executing the 
Innocent, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1, 16 (noting that the death penalty has historically ―been reserved almost 
exclusively for those who are poor‖); Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row Inmate 
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felons in many states burden not just those convicted of serious crimes but 
the communities from which they come, depriving them of representation 
proportionate to their population.
344
  
These are burdens not faced by the general population. ―People like 
us‖—the affluent and well-connected in society—don‘t commit murder 
very often, but when they do, it is exceedingly rare that they end up on 
death row.
345
 Thus, some scholars have argued that ―the death penalty 
context presents the quintessential case for the Court‘s countermajoritarian 
function. If there is any place one would want and expect the Supreme 
Court to guard against majoritarian overreaching, it is a capital case.‖346 
All of this would suggest that the plaintiff in many Eighth Amendment 
cases would be entitled to heightened or even strict scrutiny. But the issue 
is not quite so simple. The point of many laws, especially criminal laws, is 
―to sort people . . . for differential treatment.‖347 There is nothing wrong 
with imprisoning convicted murderers and rapists, even though the law 
will clearly treat the incarcerated very differently than it treats the rest of 
us. The law, in fact, treats them differently because it wants to discourage 
the very behavior that put them in this class in the first place. Grave flaws 
in the criminal justice system should make us wary of trusting its 
outcomes too much,
348
 but the system would likely function even worse if 
 
 
Characteristics, Adjustment, and Confinement: A Critical Review of the Literature, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & 
L. 191, 195 (2002) (―African-Americans are markedly over-represented on death row compared with 
their percentage of the population (42.72% versus 12.3%).‖); infra note 355.  
 344. See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate 
over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1161 (2004) (arguing that felon 
disenfranchisement laws ―penalize not only actual wrongdoers, but also the communities from which 
incarcerated prisoners come and the communities to which ex-offenders return by reducing their 
relative political clout‖).  
 345. ELY, supra note 20, at 176; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 251–52 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (―One searches our chronicles in vain for the execution of any member of the 
affluent strata of this society.‖).  
 346. Lain, Deciding Death, supra note 87, at 5; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in 
Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 459 (1999) (―Those . . . in prisons . . . are 
classic discrete and insular minorities, who have little political power.‖); Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, 
supra note 309, at 20 (arguing that if ever a group was unable to protect itself politically, it is the 
―universe of criminal suspects‖).  
 347. See ELY, supra note 20, at 135; KOMESAR, supra note 12, at 251 (―The very essence of 
public policy is differentiating and distinguishing.‖).  
 348. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1716–18 
(2008) (arguing that even with the development of DNA evidence, the criminal justice system still has 
inadequate procedures for dealing with claims of actual innocence); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging 
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 121–31 (2008) (discussing the failure of the criminal justice 
system to properly address claims of factual innocence in cases that subsequently resulted in 
exoneration through DNA); James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 
1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1846–60 (2000) (finding that, during the period of study, sixty-
eight of one hundred capital convictions were reversed for serious errors); James S. Liebman, The 
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every criminal defendant or convicted felon challenging some aspect of 
that system‘s constitutionality could trigger strict scrutiny merely by filing 
a complaint.  
Nor would it be realistic to expect judges to adopt such a view. Indeed, 
while aspects of our criminal justice system are deeply troubling, it is not 
constitutionally suspect in the same way that, say, Jim Crow was. Despite 
the flaws, including some instances of police and prosecutor misconduct, 
most participants on all sides of the criminal justice system want it to be 
fair; surely the same could not be said for law in the Jim Crow South.
349
 
Additionally, while the inequities of the criminal justice system fall 
disproportionately on minorities and the poor, the system as a whole 
(unlike Jim Crow) does not deliberately target minorities.
350
 Accordingly, 
it would be neither realistic nor doctrinally justifiable to apply heightened 
scrutiny to Eighth Amendment challenges comparable to deliberate state 
race discrimination.
351
  
None of this is to downplay the serious flaws and racial inequality of 
the system today.
352
 If we take footnote four seriously, we must admit that 
the political system simply cannot protect capital defendants and death 
row inmates‘ constitutional interests, and that poor, inner-city minorities 
bear the disproportionate brunt of society‘s fear of and anger about crime 
at all stages of the criminal justice system.
353
 Courts, in other words, 
should be more sensitive to the inequities of the criminal justice system 
and should approach many policies regarding criminal suspects, 
 
 
Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2032 (2000) (arguing that police, prosecutors, 
and judges have strong incentives to ―overproduce‖ death sentences, relative to what would be 
appropriate based solely on substantive law). 
 349. Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: An 
Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 263 (2007) (―Unlike state violence 
inflicted in the Jim Crow era explicitly to reinstate blacks‘ slave status, today‘s criminal codes and 
procedures operate under the cloak of colorblind due process.‖).  
 350. Id.; see also William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1972 (2008) 
[hereinafter Stuntz, Unequal Justice] (―Official racism is an unlikely explanation for a massive rise in 
black punishment . . . .‖) (footnote omitted). But see infra notes 352–53 and accompanying text. 
 351. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (subjecting Virginia miscegenation 
statute to the ―most rigid scrutiny‖ (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) 
(internal quotation marks omitted))).  
 352. See, e.g., Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 350, at 1970 (―American criminal justice is rife 
with inequality.‖).  
 353. See generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: 
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 766–
69 (1995) (arguing that due to intense political pressures, elected judges ―heed, and perhaps even lead, 
the popular cries for the death of criminal defendants‖); Bright, supra note 343, at 12 (―[I]n many 
courthouses . . . everything looks the same as it did during the period of Jim Crow justice‖) (footnote 
omitted); Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 94–95 (2009) 
(arguing that the criminal justice system devalues black victims). 
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defendants, and convicts with more skepticism than they do.
354
 The 
extreme deference applied in Baze, then, was inappropriate.
355
  
As for epistemic authority, Kentucky demonstrated more expertise than 
many states, but not enough to justify the Court‘s great deference. It is true 
that Kentucky required that ―members of the IV team must have at least 
one year of professional experience as a certified medical assistant, 
phlebotomist, EMT, paramedic, or military corpsman.‖356 Pursuant to 
these requirements, Kentucky employed a phlebotomist and an EMT 
during executions.
357
 These facts suggest that the State took some steps to 
find competent people to carry out the procedure. Other facts, however, 
suggest that the Court should have been still more attuned to questions of 
epistemic authority. For example, like other states, Kentucky appears to 
have had no particular understanding of the drugs it selected. Instead, it 
just copied Oklahoma‘s procedure, offering a ―‗stereotyped reaction‘ to an 
issue, rather than a careful analysis of relevant considerations favoring or 
disfavoring a conclusion.‖358 Additionally, the protocol used in Baze 
 
 
 354. Obviously, the level of scrutiny will also turn on the substance of the precise policy and the 
applicable doctrine for a particular constitutional provision.  
 355. State lethal injection policies, of course, do not deliberately target racial minorities. But death 
row inmates are disproportionately poor, racial minorities. See, e.g., David C. Baldus & George 
Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the 
Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 194, 213 
(2005) (―[B]lack offenders whose victims are white are at particular risk of more punitive treatment 
. . . .‖); Michael Tonry, Theories and Policies Underlying Guidelines Systems: Obsolescence and 
Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1255 tbl.3 (2005) (noting that in 
2002, nearly 50% of federal and state prison inmates were black); supra note 343. They, therefore, 
come from groups that are already underrepresented in the political process generally and in the 
criminal justice system, in particular. See, e.g., Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King 
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109–246, § 2(b)(7), 120 
Stat. 577, 578 (2006) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973) (―Despite the progress made by 
minorities under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the evidence before Congress reveals that 40 years has 
not been a sufficient amount of time to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination following nearly 100 
years of disregard for the dictates of the 15th amendment and to ensure that the right of all citizens to 
vote is protected as guaranteed by the Constitution.‖); Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 350, at 1973 
(arguing that the weakening of poor city neighborhoods‘ electoral power during the second half of the 
twentieth century has significantly contributed to inequalities in the American justice system). To this 
extent, flawed execution methods, like most features of the death penalty, disproportionately affect a 
population whose political power to remedy those flaws is comparatively weak. See Stuntz, Civil-
Criminal Line, supra note 309, at 20–21 (arguing that criminal suspects cannot protect themselves 
politically). To be sure, these factors do not make the method unconstitutional, but they do implicate 
political process concerns and, therefore, undermine some of the policy‘s political authority. See, e.g., 
ELY, supra note 20, at 135–80.  
 356. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1533 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 357. Id. A phlebotomist is trained to insert catheters into veins. 
 358. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1545 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 
U.S. 495, 519, 520–21 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also Denno, Quandary, supra note 44, at 
78–79 (explaining that all lethal-injection states have copied Oklahoma‘s procedure).  
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required the DOC warden ―to reconstitute the Sodium Thiopental into 
solution form prior to injection,‖ even though he ―ha[d] no formal training 
on reconstituting the drug‖ and the process is, in fact, quite complicated.359 
The Baze plurality missed these issues, inquiring only into paper 
credentials—not actual competence in administering lethal injection—
even though experience in other states demonstrates that some personnel 
may ―look good on paper‖ but do not possess the skills or temperament to 
carry out lethal injection safely.
360
  
All of this suggests that the plurality‘s preemptive deference in Baze 
was inappropriate. The Court was correct that the record lacked evidence 
sufficient to strike down the Kentucky procedure. But instead of upholding 
a procedure about which it knew very little, the plurality should have 
remanded for further fact finding.
361
 And the plurality certainly should not 
have cast its decision so broadly so as to try to resolve many other lethal 
injection challenges, including those in states with more developed 
records. In short, attention to the challenged procedure‘s democratic 
pedigree would have counseled in favor of much less judicial deference.  
2. Kennedy 
Kennedy also looks poorly reasoned in light of democratic pedigree 
factors. The Court applied heightened scrutiny in overturning the 
Louisiana statute, but it neither articulated nor justified such scrutiny. 
Under the ―political authority‖ inquiry, application of such heightened 
scrutiny for a legislatively enacted statute seems antidemocratic, especially 
in light of the deference to state legislatures in Baze, where the legislative 
involvement was minimal. Of course, to the extent that prosecutors and 
juries enjoy discretion respectively about whether to seek and impose the 
death penalty, the implementation of a statute like Louisiana‘s is not solely 
 
 
 359. Baze v. Rees, No. 04-01094, 2005 WL 5797977, at *3 (Cir. Ct. Ky. July 8, 2005); see also 
Ty Alper, What Do Lawyers Know About Lethal Injection?, 1 HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV. 1, 2–4 (Mar. 3, 
2008), http://www.hlpronline.com/2008/03/what-do-lawyers-know-about-lethal-injection/ (discussing 
state personnel‘s lack of understanding). 
 360. Missouri, Arizona, and the federal government, for instance, have all employed in their 
procedures the same dyslexic surgeon, who admitted to not knowing how much anesthetic he had 
prepared and who misunderstood basic principles of anesthesiology. See Trial Transcript at 29–57, 
Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1236660 (W.D. Mo. May 5, 2006) (medical expert 
testifying about the numerous wrong medical statements made by Dr. Doe); Berger, supra note 7, at 
269–70 (discussing Doe).  
 361. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1572 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (calling for remand); cf. Citizens to 
Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (―[T]he court must consider whether the 
decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors . . . .‖). 
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the legislature‘s decision.362 Nevertheless, Kennedy functioned as a facial 
challenge to the statute imposing capital punishment for the crime of child 
rape. The statute‘s political authority does not automatically make it 
constitutional, but, given the rhetoric about democratic values in cases like 
Baze, the Court‘s failure to address the issue is striking.363  
As for epistemic authority, the Court implicitly determined that the 
legislature had little, concluding that the death penalty for child rape did 
not serve the legitimate penological purposes of deterrence and retribution. 
With regards to deterrence, the Court worried that the death penalty for 
child rape might ―add[] to the risk of non-reporting‖ and remove the 
perpetrator‘s incentive not to kill the victim.364 The Court, however, 
conceded that ―we know little about‖ these inquiries.365 Its conclusion that 
capital punishment is an insufficient deterrent, therefore, rested on 
empirically shaky ground, and yet the Court had no problem striking down 
the state policy.
366
  
Even more curious is the Court‘s treatment of retribution. Retribution 
perhaps might be best thought of as a moral determination.
367
 The Court 
nevertheless seemed to treat retribution in places as a factual inquiry into 
whether ―the child rape victim‘s hurt is lessened when the law permits the 
death of the perpetrator.‖368 Drawing on research about the emotional 
effects of courtroom testimony by child victims, the Court found that it 
was ―not at all evident‖ that the victim‘s hurt would be lessened.369 
Relying on these findings, the Court in Kennedy then determined that 
capital punishment did not adequately serve a retributive purpose, even 
 
 
 362. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 870 (2009) (―It is hard to overstate the power of federal 
prosecutors.‖). 
 363. The ―unpopular minority‖ prong of political authority should function much as it should in 
Baze, justifying some heightened level of scrutiny, but not the very rigorous review applied in 
Kennedy. See supra notes 340–54. 
 364. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2663 (2008). 
 365. Id. at 2663–64.  
 366. See supra Part I.B.3.  
 367. See W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and 
the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 896 (2009) (arguing that juries ―express[] the 
moral judgments ineluctably tied to the retributive principles at the heart of criminal law‖); Douglas A. 
Berman, Should Juries Be the Guide for Adventures Through Apprendi-Land?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 65, 69 (2009) (discussing retribution as a moral question). Alternatively, retribution might be 
seen as a quasi-factual inquiry into whether a particular punishment is consistent with the principles of 
our criminal law, but the Court did not seem to engage in such an analysis. 
 368. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2662.  
 369. Id. 
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though the facts upon which it relied were neither obviously correct nor 
obviously relevant to the question of retribution.
370
  
Kennedy‘s questionable reliance on questionable facts is especially 
striking because the Court never explained how its facts were relevant or 
why its view of uncertain evidence was sufficient to overrule the 
legislature. Nor did it explain why it was epistemologically better 
positioned to make these factual determinations than the legislature. This 
omission is noteworthy, given that other cases have emphasized that 
―[s]electing the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be 
made by state legislatures, not federal courts.‖371  
The Court‘s analysis in Kennedy is also perplexing because it could 
have more easily arrived at the same outcome. Given that the Eighth 
Amendment limits the kind of punishment society can impose, the Court 
could have more candidly emphasized that the Eighth Amendment forbids 
capital punishment in close cases, such as nonhomicide crimes.
372
 
Similarly, it could have acknowledged that, at some level, the propriety of 
capital punishment for a particular crime hinges not on factual inquiries 
but on moral calculations that defy empirical analysis.
373
 To be sure, such 
admissions would force the Court to concede that it was essentially 
substituting its moral judgment for the legislature‘s,374 but many believed 
that the Court was ultimately doing that anyway.
375
 Attention to political 
and epistemic authority, then, might not have changed the result, but it 
would have encouraged a more coherent opinion and greater judicial 
candor about the factors really driving the decision.  
Instead, the Court only briefly acknowledged ―the necessity to 
constrain the use of the death penalty‖376 and purported to engage in an 
 
 
 370. See id. at 2662–63 (explaining, ―our conclusion that imposing the death penalty for child rape 
would not further retributive purposes‖).  
 371. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 372. The Court did concede that ―there are moral grounds [on which] to question a rule barring 
capital punishment for a crime against an individual that did not result in death,‖ but its analysis 
nevertheless rested significantly on facts it thought relevant to deterrence and retribution. See Kennedy, 
128 S. Ct. at 2658, 2661–64. But see Graham v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 2011, 2016–17 (2010) (articulating 
more clearly a categorical rule against capital punishment for nonhomicide crimes). 
 373. The dissent certainly saw this as a moral question. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2676 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (―[I]s it really true that every person who is convicted of capital murder and sentenced to 
death is more morally depraved than every child rapist?‖).  
 374. Alternatively, the Court could have asked whether the challenged punishment is consistent 
with principles of deserved culpability embodied in our criminal laws.  
 375. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2008) (describing majority opinion in 
Kennedy as ―giving effect to the majority‘s own preference‖) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of 
rehearing).  
 376. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660.  
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ostensibly factual study of retributive effects, deterrent effects, and other 
states‘ policies. These facts may be relevant, but many of them are also, as 
the Court itself conceded, subject to dispute.
377
 The Court never justified 
why its interpretation of uncertain facts should be superior to the State‘s 
interpretation. Relatedly, the Court also insufficiently explained why its 
epistemic authority in Kennedy was superior to the legislature‘s (when it 
often is not) or why that putative epistemic authority should trump the 
state legislature‘s political authority (when it often does not). Given that 
deference in Baze (and elsewhere) is premised on the political branches‘ 
political and epistemic authority,
378
 Kennedy‘s disregard for these 
important questions is striking.  
D. Advantages 
1. Normative Advantages  
A democratic pedigree theory of deference has several advantages, 
both normative and practical. Normatively, it helps encourage desirable 
behavior in both the political branches and the judiciary itself. With 
regards to the political branches, it helps promote healthy democracy. By 
increasing the level of judicial scrutiny of administrative policies, it 
encourages legislatures to delegate with greater specificity and with 
instructions to agencies to create rules with the force of law. While some 
legislatures delegate to avoid taking the political heat, they might be 
somewhat less inclined to do so if they knew that the resulting policy 
would be reviewed more stringently—and if resulting legal difficulties 
would generate attention reflecting poorly on the legislature. Under the 
proposed theory of deference, courts would at least consider whether 
legislatures are engaged in difficult policy decisions.
379
  
Additionally, in prioritizing administrative principles such as 
formalized procedures, oversight, and transparency, courts would 
encourage agencies to respect these values. Transparent, formalized 
lawmaking is more likely to encourage open deliberation among 
policymakers and constituents than secretive, informal rulemaking.
380
 
Transparency, in particular, is a friend to democratic accountability, 
 
 
 377. See id. at 2663–64 (conceding uncertainty about several important facts and inquiries). 
 378. See supra Parts I.A, III.A.  
 379. Cf. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 15 (arguing for a constitutional theory that 
promotes ―a sharing of [the nation‘s] sovereign authority‖ among its people).  
 380. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 135–36 (discussing virtues of transparent 
lawmaking).  
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motivating public officials to pay closer attention to their duties and 
encouraging citizens to deliberate about public policy.
381
 
Collectively, by nudging legislatures to participate more in 
policymaking and agencies to make policies more openly, this approach to 
judicial deference would help promote democratic deliberation.
382
 Such 
deliberation is generally valuable, but perhaps especially so for a policy 
issue like the death penalty.
383
 Reasonable people, of course, can disagree 
about the moral propriety of capital punishment, but democratic 
deliberation could help force both legislators and their constituents to 
scrutinize both their own views and widespread misinformation about 
these hard issues.
384
 Similarly, such attention could encourage 
administrators crafting policies to take greater consideration of relevant 
constitutional values, such as the Eighth Amendment.  
Relatedly, administrative agencies often make decisions impacting 
constitutional rights, and yet judges in constitutional cases often pay scant 
attention to how agencies operate. Inattention to agency practices might be 
especially pronounced in the area of criminal justice.
385
 But, as Professor 
Barkow argues, it is precisely in the highly politicized criminal justice 
context that agencies need to be well ―designed to operate successfully.‖386 
The proposed theory would require litigants and, thus, courts to look more 
closely at agency practices in constitutional cases, thereby encouraging 
agencies to implement policies through regular, transparent procedures.
387
 
 
 
 381. Id. at 97–98.  
 382. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 257, at 522 (―[A]gencies should have 
an obligation to take constitutional norms and requirements seriously in their decisionmaking.‖); 
Murphy, supra note 247, at 1303 (arguing that adjusting deference based on the quality of deliberation 
would help ―improve legislative constitutional deliberations‖); cf. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 13 (2008) 
(arguing in favor of governmental policies that ―nudge‖ actors to behave in ways that benefit the 
common good while imposing minimal costs).  
 383. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 4 (arguing that deliberation is an especially 
appropriate way for citizens to resolve moral disagreements).  
 384. See, e.g., ROBERT JAY LIFTON & GREG MITCHELL, WHO OWNS DEATH?: CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, AND THE END OF EXECUTIONS 214–15 (2000) (arguing 
that states have reinstated or abolished capital punishment based on ―perceived public sentiment‖ and 
―false assumptions‖ rather than ―actual studies‖); James R. Acker, Be Careful What You Ask For: 
Lessons from New York’s Recent Experience with Capital Punishment, 32 VT. L. REV. 683, 712 n.129 
(2008) (discussing various studies concluding that, contrary to popular myth, ―capital punishment 
imposed costs greatly in excess of life imprisonment‖); Craig Haney, Exoneration and Wrongful 
Condemnations: Expanding the Zone of Perceived Injustice in Death Penalty Cases, 37 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 131, 143 (2006) (―[T]he widespread dissemination of misinformation has produced basic 
misconceptions about the death penalty held by many members of the public.‖).  
 385. See Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 223, at 813–14.  
 386. Id. 
 387. Of course, ordinary administrative law, such as the APA, encourages these same values. But, 
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Greater attention to administrative norms is not just an abstract goal but 
should result in more carefully designed policy. For example, critics of 
lethal injection argue that the procedure‘s dangers result directly from a 
―pervasive lack of professionalism.‖388 By turning attention to the 
administrative processes by which a policy is adopted, courts could more 
easily identify whether a challenged procedure is undeserving of deference 
for arbitrariness or lack of ―professionalism.‖389  
As for the judiciary, this theory helps encourage judicial reflection and 
candor about the level of deference it is applying.
390
 While the Court does 
overtly select a level of deference in some areas like equal protection,
391
 in 
other areas it is less forthcoming about the level of scrutiny it is applying 
or the factors triggering that scrutiny. But whether they admit it or not, 
courts review government policy and facts in constitutional cases with 
varying degrees of deference. Encouraging judges to apply a theory of 
deference will help them become aware of the assumptions they 
sometimes make unconsciously.
392
  
Considering democratic pedigree also helps shed light on particularly 
curious doctrinal moves. If the Court places special emphasis on the 
respect for democratic pedigree in one constitutional case but seemingly 
ignores such principles in a different case implicating the same 
constitutional provision, it has some explaining to do. The Court‘s 
alternating respect and disrespect for federalism in Eighth Amendment 
cases provides a helpful example. In the capital proportionality cases, the 
Court is insensitive to federalist principles, allowing the policy of a 
majority of states to trump other states‘ policies, notwithstanding the 
theory of federalism that states are laboratories of experimentation.
393
 By 
 
 
as Baze demonstrates, the propriety of agency action sometimes arises in constitutional challenges, so 
predicating deference in constitutional cases on regular, transparent agency procedures could 
encourage agencies to pay more attention to their procedures, especially in cases where the APA does 
not reach a particular agency. See, e.g., supra notes 302, 334.  
 388. Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2006); see also Berger, supra note 7, 
at 268–73, 301–14 (detailing problems with states‘ development of lethal injection procedures). 
 389. See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 258, at 515–27 (discussing significance of 
arbitrariness in ―constitutional‖ administrative law cases).  
 390. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 257, at 534–36 (arguing in favor of 
greater judicial candor).  
 391. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 266, at 669–74 (discussing tiers of scrutiny for equal 
protection analysis). 
 392. Cf. Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 599 (2006) (encouraging courts to ―avoid deciding a case without at least 
testing their convictions‖).  
 393. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 62, at 1125–42 (discussing federalism problems in 
proportionality cases); supra Part I.B.2.a.  
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contrast, in the method-of-execution cases, courts have cited federalism as 
a reason not to interfere with state execution procedures, even if those 
procedures have been designed beyond the gaze of the legislature and 
general public.
394
 Increased judicial candor about the factors driving 
decision making can help increase judges‘ self reflection about the 
decisions they render.  
2. Practical Advantages  
From a practical standpoint, the democratic pedigree proposal is 
modest enough to appeal to some judges. More normative theories may 
rethink the law in illuminating ways, but they are less likely to impact the 
way judges decide cases. First, while the theory of deference proposed 
here asks courts to make difficult determinations about political and 
epistemic authority, it is actually consistent with principles that courts 
have embraced in other constitutional contexts. Despite the considerable 
deference given to agency interpretations of the statutes they administer,
395
 
the Court nevertheless favors legislative over administrative action in 
certain constitutional contexts. For example, in Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong,
396
 the Court struck down the Civil Service Commission‘s ban on 
the federal employment of aliens, but indicated that the case may well 
have turned out differently had there been ―an explicit determination by 
Congress or the President to exclude all noncitizens from the federal 
service.‖397 The Court decided the case on equal protection grounds, but 
the challenged policy‘s weak democratic pedigree figured substantially in 
the Court‘s reasoning.   
These democratic pedigree principles also form an important 
constitutional backdrop against which the Court interprets statutes. While 
federal courts have not revived the non-delegation doctrine, they have 
created nondelegation canons, indicating their preference for clear 
legislative statements over agency-made policy where certain 
constitutional principles are on the line.
398
 For instance, whereas courts 
 
 
 394. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 7, at 261, 286–93 (discussing deference offered to state 
execution procedures in method-of-execution cases). As noted above, the fact that state counting 
confirms the practice challenged in Baze and undermines the practice challenged in Kennedy does not 
adequately justify the different approaches to federalism. See supra Part I.B.2.a.  
 395. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
 396. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).  
 397. Id. at 116; see also Barron & Kagan, supra note 268, at 236 n.126 (discussing Mow Sun 
Wong). 
 398. See, e.g., Sunstein, Nondelegation Principles, supra note 271, at 139 (arguing that the 
nondelegation doctrine, far from being dead, has been relocated in ―a series of more specific and 
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typically defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes 
under Chevron, due to federalism principles, they typically will not defer 
to agency views that state law is preempted.
399
 Similarly, courts view 
skeptically agency interpretations applying statutes retroactively, 
indicating that such decisions should be made instead by Congress.
400
  
The Court also distrusts vague grants of delegation. In the free speech 
context, for example, the Court has been skeptical of schemes granting 
government officials standardless discretion over licenses to speak.
401
 In 
Freedman v. Maryland,
402
 the Court explained that the statute there 
―lack[ed] sufficient safeguards for confining the censor‘s action to 
judicially determined constitutional limits, and therefore contain[ed] the 
same vice as a statute delegating excessive administrative discretion.‖403 In 
other words, the licensing cases reflect not just free speech principles but 
also concerns about delegations without intelligible principles, formalized 
procedures, oversight, or transparency. When an administrative agent has 
unsupervised, unguided discretion, the delegation itself becomes 
problematic, casting constitutional doubt on that agent‘s licensing 
determinations.
404
 
Along similar lines, the Court sometimes polices the scope of 
delegation, refusing to give agencies more authority than Congress 
conferred.
405
 In Gonzales v. Oregon,
406
 the Court refused to allow the 
 
 
smaller, though quite important, nondelegation doctrines‖).  
 399. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) (considering the ―thoroughness, 
consistency, and persuasiveness‖ of the agency‘s explanation of state law‘s impact on the federal 
scheme); Sunstein, Nondelegation Principles, supra note 271, at 148–49.  
 400. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (―[A] statutory grant of 
legislative rulemaking authority will not . . . be understood to encompass the power to promulgate 
retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express terms.‖); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 332 (2000) (explaining that the rule disfavoring 
congressional delegation of authority to apply laws retroactively is ―an institutional echo of the notion 
that the Due Process Clause forbids retroactive application of law‖). 
 401. See Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) (invalidating county 
ordinance giving impermissibly standardless discretion to county administrator to determine whether 
demonstrators must pay a $1000-a-day fee); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 226 (1990); 
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ‘g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755–58 (1988); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 
51, 56–57 (1965). 
 402. 380 U.S. at 51. 
 403. Id. at 57. 
 404. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 257, at 6–7 (―[T]he Court‘s decisions 
on parade licensing have underscored the importance of officials being required to explain their 
decisions, a typically administrative requirement.‖). 
 405. See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131–
43 (2000) (finding that Congress did not delegate to the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products); 
Manning, supra note 272, at 226–27 (arguing that Brown & Williamson‘s refusal to find delegation of 
authority to regulate tobacco was animated by nondelegation concerns).  
 406. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
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Attorney General to interpret the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) 
to forbid Oregon from allowing physicians to assist the suicide of 
terminally ill patients, given that the CSA nowhere delegated authority to 
the Attorney General over that subject matter.
407
 Courts thus can and do 
make sure that agency action does not exceed the terms of the legislative 
delegation.  
Beyond administrative norms, democratic pedigree concerns help 
shape constitutional doctrine in still other ways. Perhaps most notably, 
courts have frequently identified concern for unpopular minorities as a 
factor in their constitutional reasoning. Equal protection doctrine, of 
course, is explicitly concerned with policies uniquely targeting unpopular 
groups, especially racial groups.
408
 But these principles have proved 
significant in other doctrinal areas, too, even where the Court has refused 
to find the burdened group a suspect class. Lawrence v. Texas, for 
instance, was ostensibly decided as a due process case, but emphasized the 
stigma resulting from the challenged ban on homosexual sodomy.
409
 The 
Court, then, has paid special attention to laws burdening groups that, at 
least in some places, are unable to protect themselves adequately through 
normal political channels. 
Even the criminal procedure revolution can be explained partially in 
democratic pedigree terms.
410
 The criminal procedure decisions of the 
Warren Court sought to protect unpopular groups (especially poor blacks) 
from unfair police treatment and therefore served as a kind of 
 
 
 407. Id. at 275.  
 408. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (stating that the primary purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is to prevent discrimination based on race); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339, 346 (1960) (―When a legislature . . . singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for 
special discriminatory treatment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment.‖); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 489–93 (1954) (discussing history of the Fourteenth Amendment ―as proscribing all state-
imposed discriminations against the Negro race‖); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
473 U.S. 432, 442–43 (1985) (noting mentally retarded people‘s inability to protect themselves and 
holding unconstitutional a requirement of a special permit for a proposed home for them); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (―Aliens as a class are a prime example of a ‗discrete and 
insular minority‘ . . . for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.‖ (quoting United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citation omitted))). 
 409. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (―When homosexual conduct is made 
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual 
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.‖).  
 410. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68, 478–79 (1966) (applying privilege 
against self-incrimination in interrogation setting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 660 (1961) 
(―holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments‖ and that because the ―right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state 
officers is . . . constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty 
promise‖).  
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antidiscrimination law.
411
 Significantly, the governmental actors in these 
cases are rarely politically accountable legislators, but rather law 
enforcement officials who lack the constitutional authority to issue a 
constitutional judgment on the matter at hand. If courts reflexively 
deferred to police judgments on Fifth and Sixth Amendment questions, 
then a criminal suspect would never get ―a responsible and competent 
judgment on the constitutionality of what has been done to him‖ except by 
―his formal adversaries in the criminal process.‖412 As Professor Black 
puts it, ―[t]hat cannot be right.‖413 In short, various strands of the 
democratic pedigree theory fit with long-standing constitutional principles.  
A second pragmatic justification for the theory proposed here is that it 
responds to current theories behind judicial deference. When courts defer 
in constitutional cases, they typically cite concerns about their political or 
epistemic authority relative to the challenged political branch. But quite 
often in constitutional adjudication, the standard of review seems 
unmoored from these concerns. Sometimes, this is for very good 
substantive reasons, such as requiring strict scrutiny for racial 
discrimination or for laws burdening speech on the basis of content.
414
 But 
in some areas of constitutional adjudication, where the Court silently 
applies varying levels of deference, it is odd that the deference or lack 
thereof is so disconnected from the reasons courts give when they defer. 
This proposed theory would bring courts‘ practices of deference more in 
line with their own theories.  
Third, by encouraging courts to articulate the reasons for granting or 
not granting deference, this theory will provide more guidance for both 
litigants and lower courts. It is true, of course, that the multi-factor test 
proposed here is complicated and, therefore, an imperfect guide for lower 
courts. But to the extent it identifies factors that courts should consider in 
gauging the deference they apply, it is still an improvement over the 
stealth deference determinations under current doctrine.  
 
 
 411. See ELY, supra note 20, at 97 (discussing the Fourth Amendment as a means of policing 
processes of representation and thus as a ―harbinger of the Equal Protection Clause‖); William J. 
Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 
5 (1997) (―Warren-era constitutional criminal procedure began as a kind of antidiscrimination law.‖). 
 412. See BLACK, supra note 30, at 78.  
 413. Id.  
 414. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster v. Members of N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118–21 
(1991) (applying strict scrutiny to content discrimination in free speech context); Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (subjecting racial classifications to ―the most rigid scrutiny‖ (quoting Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
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Finally, the proposed theory would not excessively unsettle current 
Eighth Amendment doctrine—or other constitutional doctrines to which it 
might apply.
415
 It would offer a new approach to judicial deference, but it 
would not disrupt current Eighth Amendment inquiries in either method-
of-execution or proportionality cases. It would, in other words, affect the 
respect afforded the government in these cases and the way in which the 
Court viewed the relevant facts, but not the actual judicial inquiries.
416
 
Courts would still ask, inter alia, if a method of execution created a 
substantial risk of serious harm or if an arguably disproportionate 
punishment served deterrent or retributive purposes. Deference, then, is 
not itself the substantive inquiry, but rather the lens through which courts 
conduct the substantive inquiry. Of course, to the extent that Eighth 
Amendment doctrine is problematic and inconsistent, some observers 
might prefer a theory that does more to revamp the area. But courts often 
move incrementally, and many judges may be more willing to rethink 
deference than to adopt an entirely new theory of criminal punishment.  
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court‘s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is in disarray, 
and the confusion is symptomatic of a much larger problem in 
constitutional decision making. In Baze, the Court applied highly 
deferential review in upholding Kentucky‘s lethal injection procedure. In 
Kennedy, it applied stringent scrutiny in striking down Louisiana‘s 
application of the death penalty to child rapists. In neither case did the 
Court justify (or even acknowledge) these vastly different approaches. 
Instead, it cloaked its analysis with malleable language and tests that recur 
in Eighth Amendment cases, giving the misleading impression of a 
coherent doctrine. But the Court‘s Eighth Amendment doctrine is anything 
but coherent, and attempts to explain the discrepancies between these two 
high-profile capital cases are just that—explanations, not adequate 
justifications. The Court therefore needs a theory of deference.  
Courts typically cite political and epistemic authority as reasons to 
defer to the political branches in constitutional cases, but they sometimes 
fail to look closely at whether those reasons are applicable in a given case. 
Attention to a challenged policy‘s democratic pedigree—its political and 
 
 
 415. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 3–74 (1999) (arguing that courts should promote democracy by deciding cases modestly and 
not revamping constitutional doctrine dramatically).  
 416. See supra Part III.C.  
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epistemic authority—would be an important step toward a sensible 
approach to deference in some constitutional contexts, particularly those 
without preexisting tests determining the level of scrutiny. With these 
concerns in mind, the Court‘s approaches in Baze and Kennedy seem 
deeply flawed. Baze offered a kind of preemptive deference to state 
execution procedures, even though many such policies are the products of 
agencies lacking both political and epistemic authority. Kennedy overruled 
Louisiana‘s judgments that capital punishment for child rape served 
retributive and deterrent purposes without explaining why (or if) the 
State‘s political and epistemic authority were lacking, or why the Court 
should overrule the State, given that important facts were neither clear nor 
necessarily probative. In light of Kennedy, it is hard to take seriously 
Baze‘s rhetoric about respecting the political judgment and expertise of 
state officials designing lethal injection procedures.  
The democratic pedigree test is admittedly only a modest step toward 
reconciling complicated and contradictory cases. Still, it would encourage 
courts to think through when and why they review state action 
deferentially. Even though the Court has crafted various tests in various 
lines of constitutional doctrine, the level of deference is often a decisive 
factor in determining the outcome of a case. This kind of test, then, could 
be an important first step toward greater judicial transparency about the 
factors really guiding the stringency of judicial review in constitutional 
cases. 
 
